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ABSTRACT 
Since 2003 FDI inflows to Bulgaria have been growing steadily. This paper addresses the 
question which the main factors determining this significant increase are. The analysis is 
based on a large amount of macroeconomic data as well as the record of the process of 
integration of Bulgaria into the European Union (EU) and reforms in the country. Results 
show that privatization was an important determinant of FDI in the beginning of the examined 
period (until 2005), but after that other cross-border mergers and acquisitions and especially 
greenfield investment gained more importance relative to privatization. In addition, low 
labour costs and removed tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade (as prerequisites for efficiency-
seeking FDI) and reforms related to the accession of the country into the EU (which 
ultimately led to improvement of the business environment) also proved to be important 
determinants of FDI inflows to Bulgaria. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The boom in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the recent decades and especially after the 
mid 1990s has been widely discussed among scholars. The numbers are indisputable – year 
2007 saw another peak in FDI inflows, a rise of 30 % inflows to reach $1,833 billion, well 
above the previous record peak in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2008). Notably, FDI inflows to all 
regions of the world, irrespective of the type of countries included (developed, developing, or 
least developed and transition) registered a record high levels of FDI inflows in 2007. Even 
though the expected decline in FDI has been happening due to the world financial crisis, the 
amounts of FDI inflows and stocks in the world economy are so impressive that they deserve 
unceasing attention. 
What makes a difference in the recent years is the growing importance of the developing and 
transition countries as a recipient and donor of FDI. One of the most attractive destinations of 
FDI is Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). After the fall of the Iron curtain in 
the beginning of 1990s these countries have walked a long way of reforms, opening and 
integration into the world economy.  
In the beginning of 1990s virtually all enterprises in Bulgaria were state-owned and the 
planned economy had existed for forty-five years. The country had to go through many 
painful and challenging reforms in order to reach its current position as a European Union 
member.  
One of the biggest successes of the country is its development into an attractive FDI 
destination. Facts and numbers show that since the year 2003 the FDI inflows started 
increasing substantially (see Table 1 below). 
Table 1: Direct investment in reporting country (Millions of US$, at Current Exchange Rates) 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bulgaria 103 94 108 427 536 813 1 026 812 926 1 421 2 596 4 319 7 535 8 910 
Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database, compiled from national and international (CIS, EUROSTAT, 
IMF, OECD) official sources. Available at http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/Saveshow.asp; derived on 24 
February 2009. Only years with available data are shown. 
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 In 2006 Bulgaria was the fifth largest recipient among the South-East European (SEE) 
countries and the Commonwealth of independent states (CIS)1 with only the Russian 
Federation, Romania, Kazakhstan, Ukraine (in this order) receiving higher amounts of inward 
FDI. The large increase in FDI inflows for this year could be attributed to the anticipation of 
the accession of the country into the EU on 1 January 2007 and to a series of privatization 
deals (UNCTAD, 2007). But before the inward FDI reached this point, it is indisputable that 
they started to grow with a fast pace on a yearly basis as early as 2003 as I said above. 
Another fact is that in the year 2003 when the FDI inflows to Bulgaria started to rise, their 
magnitude worldwide shrank for a third consecutive year from $651 billion in 2002 to $560 
billion. The inflows to CEECs also decreased by around one third from $31 billion to $21 
billion. The interesting fact here is that while the inflows to some of the countries in the 
region including Bulgaria grew, the CEECs which were anticipated to be accepted into the 
EU in 20042 also saw a plunge into the FDI flows. In addition, this decline occurred despite 
the effort of some of these countries to enhance their attractiveness to foreign investors by 
lowering the corporate tax level (UNCTAD, 2003 and 2004). The decline of FDI flows to 
CEECs, Baltic and CIS countries was mainly due to the end of privatization in the Check 
republic and Slovakia (UNCTAD, 2004) 
Based on the facts presented above, I would like to pay a special attention to the impressive 
transformation of Bulgaria into an attractive host country for FDI. The purpose of my 
research which will be presented in this master thesis is to analyse and try to outline the main 
factors with greatest contribution to the substantial increase of the FDI inflows.  
A huge amount of literature exists with main focus on the determinants of FDI. Many 
empirical studies have been conducted and pointed out various reasons why certain countries 
are more attractive as recipients of FDI than others. There are also many research papers 
devoted to the determinants of FDI going to the CEECs named as  
                                                 
1 According to EBRD South-East European countries include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (derived from Table A.2.8 from the “Transition report 2007: People in 
transition” data available at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/mptfdi.xls) 
2 Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Check Republic (UNCTAD, 2004) 
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transition countries3. Some of these research papers and their results and conclusions will be 
presented in the Literature review section of the thesis.  
Based on the available research information on the determinants of FDI in general and on the 
determinants of FDI in the transition countries in CEE, I consider the following factors as 
possible contributors to the emergence of Bulgaria as an attractive FDI destination: 
1. Privatization process; 
2. Low labour costs; 
3. Reforms undertaken during the transition period, especially the ones related to the 
EU membership; 
4. Accession of Bulgaria into the single European market and EU structures, i.e. the 
pure economic effects of regional economic integration like reduction and further abolishment 
of tariffs, quotas and other barriers on trade with goods originating from EU member 
countries; 
5. Improvements in the infrastructure mainly funded with money from EU structural 
funds, but also with the participation of foreign investors, etc. 
Of course, it is too ambitious to try to determine the influence of all the factors. Thus, in this 
master’s thesis, I will focus on the five of them listed above. I realise that it will be very 
difficult and nearly impossible to separate the influence of one factor from the influence of the 
rest of them. Because of this I will conduct my analysis in the line to show how all of them 
contributed to the attraction of mainly efficiency-seeking FDI, i.e. multinational companies 
(MNCs) invest in Bulgaria in order to operate with minimum costs and thus to be more 
efficient. 
My research is based on data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Eurostat, World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and official National Statistics Bureaus. The data to be used is derived 
                                                 
3
  According to the EBRD twenty-three countries in Central and Eastern Europe and among former USSR 
republics are in transition in Europe. These include Central Europe and the Baltic states – Croatia, Check 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia; South-eastern Europe – 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia; Western CIS and 
the Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine; and Russia. Source: EBRD, 2008 
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from the official publications and reports of the institutions listed above as well as from their 
databases available online on their websites. 
My research is based on the comparison of statistical data for Bulgaria and the rest of EU 
countries, including older members and newly accepted ones from Central and Eastern 
Europe as well as data for Bulgaria and the countries which are main donors of FDI. 
Comparison is also made with some countries which are currently in negotiation process for 
EU accession as well as with some neighbouring countries. The research will also cover the 
main points in the negotiation process for EU accession, chronologically following the main 
events such as accession into the single European market. I will also pay attention to the 
reforms in the legislation and authorities efforts regarding FDI and the prerequisites 
concerning the creation of favourable conditions for inward FDI.  
By no means, the process that I will concentrate on is a complex one and I do not believe that 
defining all factors as stand alone contributors should be the main purpose of this master 
thesis. Based on this belief, I will focus on not just one or two of the factors but rather try to 
show their joint contribution to the emergence of Bulgaria as an attractive destination for 
inward FDI based on the efficiency-seeking motive. 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. In the next section the relevant theories are 
presented regarding FDI definition, classifications and determinants. In the third part existing 
literature on FDI determinants and host country effects is reviewed. Then the analysis part 
follows. The thesis is closed by research limitations and concluding remarks presented in the 
final two sections.  
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1. Brief historical overview of FDI. 
FDI is not a new and contemporary phenomenon. During the late nineteenth century there 
were tremendous flows of capital from Western Europe, and especially the Great Britain, to 
the periphery areas of Europe and the new world (America). These flows of capital amounted 
to a large percentage of the GDP of both originating and receiving countries. The greatest 
difference with what we observe today is the fact that FDI a century ago had a limited scope – 
they affected only a narrow range of industries, mainly related to natural resources extraction 
and infrastructure. The mechanism was simple: capital flows, mainly from Western Europe 
and especially the Great Britain, were going to such projects which would in turn allow 
receiving countries to export larger volumes of mainly agricultural goods and natural 
resources to the open markets of investing countries. At this time before the disruption of the 
World War I net capital outflows reached as high as 9 % of GDP on an annual average basis 
for Britain (Bordo et al, 1999). By 1914 international production and MNCs activities were an 
integral part of the global economy. The Great Britain accounted for around 45 % of the 
world FDI stock in 1914 with the USA, France and Germany being also important investors. 
At the same time the USA was the largest recipient of inward FDI due to its large market, 
abundance of natural resources and high import tariffs (Johnson, 2005). 
The World War I disrupted the international activities of firms and as a result of the war a 
large percentage of European FDI stock was destroyed. After the war, during the interwar 
period, both the global FDI stock and the number of MNCs subsidiaries increased. However, 
the pre-war level of global FDI stock wasn’t reached again before 1930s (Johnson, 2005). 
The World War II caused another serious disruption of international activity of firms and 
destruction of real capital. However, after the end of the war a suitable and favourable 
environment for MNCs activities was created. The bulk of regulatory institution for 
international activities concerning both business and governments was established in the 
decade following the end of the war. These institutions include the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) – the 
predecessor of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Breton Woods system. 
However, several changes occurred. The new military technologies created during the war 
were transformed for a use in the business and society. Thus, new areas of business 
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opportunities occurred. After the WWII the hegemony of the Great Britain as the most 
important FDI source country ended and it was replaced by the USA. The last change was the 
shift of inward FDI form developing to developed countries. For example, in 1938 developing 
countries accounted for two thirds of inward FDI flows while in 1960 two thirds of global 
FDI flowed to developed countries (Johnson, 2005). 
FDI flows, together with world trade flows, grew strongly after the WWII. For example, 
during the period of fast growth in 1960s, world FDI flows grew twice as quickly as the world 
GDP and 40 % faster than the world export. The primary sector lost its importance and was 
no longer the main destination for FDI. After 1960s the trend of developing countries losing 
importance as FDI recipient and developed countries getting larger share of FDI flows 
continued. In 1970s the diversity among the source countries of FDI increased. The same 
decade saw the first outward FDI flows from developing countries. During the same decade 
manufacturing industry emerged as the most attractive industry for FDI and the importance of 
the service sector started increasing. In the middle of 1970s the share of FDI going to the 
service sector started to increase relative to manufacturing sector. This tendency continued in 
1980s and 1990s as well (Johnson, 2005). 
Until the second half of 1980s, when the growth in FDI took off, FDI and world trade grew at 
the same pace. The increase in FDI flows and volumes of international trade happened along 
with a period of intensified globalisation and a growing importance of MNCs (Johnson, 
2005). 
Table 2: FDI inward stock by host region, millions of $ 
 1980 1990 2000 2002 2006 2007 Change 
1980-2007 
World total 692 714 1 950 303 6 089 884 7 371 554 11 998 838 15 210 560 2 096 % 
Developed 
economies 
390 740 1 399 509 4 011 686 5 049 786 8 453 853 10 458 610 2 577 % 
Developing 
economies 
301 974 547 965 1 939 926 2 093 569 3 155 856 4 246 739 1 306 % 
CEECs … 2 828 138 271 228 199 664 338 970 914 34 232 % 
Source: UNCTAD (2004), Annex table B.3. and calculations based on  UNCTAD (2007) Annex table B.2. and 
UNCTAD (2008) Annex table B.2. CEECs include Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Check Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Luthuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, TFYR Macedonia, Ukraine 
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Table 2 shows the great increase of world FDI inward stock since the beginning of 1980s. The 
increase between 1980 and 1990 was 182 %, between 1990 and 2000 – 212 %, and between 
2007 and 2000 – 150 %. The numbers are really huge. The inward FDI stock in developed 
countries has been growing faster than in the developing countries. And the countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe from virtually closed for the world economy in 1990 became 
attractive recipient for FDI inflows which have been constantly rising. Now these economies 
are quite well integrated in the global economy. 
The biggest recipient and source countries of FDI flows are shown in Tables 3 and 4: 
Table 3: Top ten most important source countries of FDI, millions of $ 
2000 2007 
Country 
Stock of 
outward FDI 
% of world 
total 
Country 
Stock of 
outward FDI 
% of world 
total 
USA 1 316 247 21.41 USA 2 791 269 17.89 
UK 897 845 14.60 UK 1 705 095 10.93 
Germany 541 861 8.81a France 1 399 036 8.97 
France 445 091 7.24 Germany 1 235 989 7.92 
China incl. 
Hong Kong 416 148 6.77
a 
China incl. 
Hong Kong 1 122 386
a 7.19 
Netherlands 305 461 4.97 Netherlands 851 274 5.46 
Japan 278 442 4.53 Spain 636 830 4.08 
Canada 237 639 3.87 Switzerland 603 622 3.87 
Switzerland 232 161 3.78 Japan 542 614 3.48 
Italy 180 275 2.93 Canada 520 737 3.34 
Sum 4 851 170 78.90 Sum 11 408 852 73.12 
World total  6 148 211 100.00 World total  15 602 339 100.00 
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2008), Annex Table B.2 
a Estimations by UNCTAD    
 
It can be seen from the table that the list of biggest source countries of FDI did not change 
much from 2000 to 2007 with the USA being the largest direct investor in the world followed 
by the UK. However, the percentage share in the world total outward stock, individually and 
as a group, declined which is due to the growing importance of developing economies as a 
source of FDI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
13 
Table 4: Top ten most important host countries of FDI, millions of $ 
2000 2007 
Country 
Stock of 
inward FDI 
% of world 
total 
Country 
Stock of 
inward FDI 
% of world 
total 
USA 1 256 867 21.72 USA 2 093 049 13.76 
China incl. Hong 
Kong 648 817 11.21 
China incl. 
Hong Kong 1 511 558 9.94 
UK 438 631 7.58 UK 1 347 688 8.86 
Germany 271 611 4.69 France 1 026 081 6.75 
France 259 775 4.49 Netherlands 673 430 4.43 
Netherlands 243 733 4.21 Germany 629 711 4.14a 
Canada 212 716 3.68 Spain 537 455 3.53 
Belgium and 
Luxemburg 195 219 3.37 Canada 520 737 3.42 
Spain 156 348 2.70 Italy 364 839 2.40 
Ireland 127 089 2.20 Brazil 328 455 2.16 
Sum 3 810 806 65.85 Sum 9 033 003 59.39 
World total  5 786 700 100.00 World total  15 210 560 100.00 
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2008), Annex Table B.2 
a Estimates of UNCTAD    
Data for Belgium and Luxemburg for 2007 are missing but it is likely that these countries would be among to ten 
FDI recipients 
The list of top ten recipient countries of FDI also did not change much – with USA, China 
and Hong Kong, and UK in the leading positions. Here, the percentage share of the individual 
countries and the group as a whole declined as well due to the increasing share of developing 
countries in the world inward FDI stock. Moreover, Brazil is even included among top ten 
host countries of FDI.  
To conclude, the importance of FDI for the world economy is by no means much greater 
today than it was a century or even 40 years ago. The evidence is that its role in the world 
economy and especially for the developing economies will continue to grow given its all time 
record high level reached in 2007 after a relative slowdown followed the previous peak in 
2000. In addition, the importance of the developing countries as a donor and recipient of FDI 
has been constantly increasing during the last two decades. (UNCTAD, 2008). 
2. Definition of FDI. 
OECD (2008), together with IMF (2003), defines FDI as the category of international 
investment which reflects the objective of an enterprise in one economy to establish a lasting 
interest in an enterprise in another economy different from its country of origin. The objective 
of lasting interest implies that the investment is undertaken in order a long-term relationship 
to be created between the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise. The long-term 
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relationship results in the ability of the direct investor to influence the management decisions 
of the direct investment enterprise. It is considered that possession of 10 % of voting shares of 
the investment enterprise is enough to assure the exertion of such influence over the 
management of the enterprise receiving FDI. The motivation to influence significantly or to 
control an enterprise in an economy different from the residence economy of the investing 
enterprise is the underlying factor that differentiates direct investment from cross-border 
portfolio investments.  
The lasting interest in a direct investment enterprise usually involves the establishment of 
manufacturing facilities or other permanent organizations abroad. This may be accomplished 
through creation of a new establishment abroad, i.e. greenfield investment, a joint venture or 
an acquisition of existing enterprise abroad (merger and/or acquisition or so called brownfield 
investment). Once a direct investment relationship has been established, all subsequent capital 
transactions between the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise and among 
affiliated enterprises resident in different economies are considered to be direct investment.  
(IMF, 2004) 
3. FDI data reporting. 
In international economic statistics, FDI data are presented as flows and stocks. FDI flows are 
recorded on net basis and they consist of equity capital, reinvested earnings and other capital. 
The equity capital refers to the initial and any subsequent investment in equity of the direct 
investment enterprise. Reinvested earnings include any retained earnings which are not 
distributed as dividends or remittances to the investing enterprise. The third component of 
FDI flows – other capital, refers to intercompany debt which includes loans, trade credits and 
any other advances to the direct investment enterprise. Similarly, FDI stocks consist of equity 
capital, reinvested earnings and other capital. In addition, some other factors influence the 
value of recorded FDI stocks: 
- price changes – changes in the market values of shares or assets of the direct 
investment enterprise; 
- exchange rate changes – fluctuation in the value of shares or intercompany loans 
denominated in a foreign to the investing enterprise currency; 
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- “other adjustments” - e.g. reclassification of portfolio investment into a direct 
investment due to reaching and exceeding the criterion of holding 10 % of voting shares. 
(IMF, 2004) 
Most often data about FDI are derived from the financial account of balance of payment of 
different countries which are prepared in accordance with “Benchmark definition of FDI” 
prepared by OECD and “Balance of payment manual” issued by IMF. Following the rules of 
the two documents provides consistency and comparability of the data. The statistics of FDI 
in Balance of payments are prepared on aggregate level. It is recommended that countries also 
prepare disaggregated statistics of FDI by major industry sector and partner country as well as 
by classifying FDI as mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and greenfield investments. 
As described in “OECD benchmark definition of Foreign direct investment” (2008) FDI 
statistics include three distinct statistical accounts: direct investment positions (stocks of 
investment) – which provide information on the total stock of investment made abroad 
(outward) and received from abroad (inward), broken down by instrument (equity and debt) 
for a given reference date; direct investment financial transactions – which show the net 
inward and outward investments presented separately by instrument (equity and debt) in any 
given reference period; and direct investment income - which provides information on the 
earnings of direct investors and of the direct investment enterprises. Direct investment 
earnings may arise from equity, i.e. essentially the profits generated by the enterprise in the 
reference period and consisting of distributed earnings (dividends) as well as undistributed 
earnings which are treated as the reinvestment of earnings in the enterprise, and from debt i.e. 
interest from inter-company loans, trade credits and other forms of debt. The concept of 
income is closely related to direct investment positions as it is the size of the overall 
investment that largely determines the income, not just the most recent transactions.  
4. Types of FDI 
4.1. Market-seeking, resource seeking and efficiency seeking FDI 
The motivation for undertaking FDI varies and it is determined by many factors including 
firm-specific, industry-specific and country-specific. Closely related to the country-specific 
determinants is the classification of FDI into market-seeking, resource seeking and efficiency 
seeking. These types of FDI are attracted by large and affluent local market with high 
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perspective demand, natural resource abundance and low cost of production factors, 
respectively (Johnson, 1995). 
4.2. Horizontal and vertical FDI 
Traditionally, economic literature also distinguishes between horizontal and vertical FDI. 
Horizontal FDI (HFDI) refers to duplicating some of the firms’ activities in a foreign country. 
Examples include building another factory producing the same goods as in the home country. 
By doing this the company forsakes some economies of scale at plant level meaning that it 
incurs losses from maintaining the same production operations in several locations (Navaretti 
& Venables, 2004). The underlying motive for undertaking HFDI is market-seeking – MNCs 
locate near the markets they serve in order to satisfy the local preferences more easily and to 
respond to changes in local demand more quickly by adapting their products (Johnson, 2005). 
On the other hand, vertical FDI (VFDI) occurs when firms split their activities by function. In 
this case we observe break in the value-added chain. Examples include building an assembling 
factory in a foreign country. Most often VFDI result in disintegration costs but the company 
gains access to cheaper production factors (Navaretti & Venables, 2004). The motivation 
behind VFDI if primarily efficiency-seeking, i.e. lowering the production costs by taking 
advantage of the differences of production factors prices (Johnson, 2005).  
5. Determinants of FDI 
5.1. OLI framework and its extensions 
One of the well-known explanations about why companies invest abroad is OLI framework, 
first introduced by John Dunning in 1976 (Dunning, 1988). According to Dunning firms which 
decide to compete with foreign companies in the environment of the latter must possess certain 
advantages that compensate for and neutralize the disadvantages stemming from operating in 
unknown environment. Multinational companies must have some qualities which national 
companies do not possess in order to compete successfully in the domestic market of the 
national firms and overcome the liability of foreignness. These advantages include ownership 
advantages, location advantages and internalization advantages, i.e. OLI. They determine the 
extent, form and pattern of international production by multinational enterprises, including the 
initial production and its expansion that may follow. 
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Ownership advantages refer to anything that can outweigh the initial disadvantage of an MNE 
to operate and produce in a foreign environment. Ownership advantages are enterprise specific 
assets (Kind & Strandeness, 2000). Dunning (1988) lists three types of ownership advantages 
that companies may employ: possession or access to specific income-generating assets; 
advantages that branch plants have as opposed to a new start-up; advantages originating from 
diversification and “multinationality per se” (p.2). Generally, ownership advantages come from 
a possession of assets which reduce costs or increase productivity of the respective MNC. This 
advantage comes from the ownership of patents, certain technology or management skills. A 
necessary condition for a MNC to be able to exploit this advantage is its domestic rivals not to 
have access to these assets. In addition, these assets must be transferable to a foreign country 
and possible to use in more than one location in order to create an advantage and precondition 
for FDI (Johnson, 2005). Dunning (1988) distinguishes between asset and transaction 
advantages of MNCs. The former relates to the ownership of assets which the other enterprises 
do not have access to and the latter one refers to MNCs capacity to capture the transactional 
benefits arising from the common management of assets located in different countries.  
According to Dunning (1988) location advantages occur whenever the MNCs find it in their 
best interests to combine their home activities with activities in foreign countries. This usually 
results in reduction of production costs in a certain location. Thus location advantages explain 
why one country is preferred over other countries including the home country of an MNC as a 
destination of investment and production (Kind & Strandenes, 2000). Location advantages cannot 
be transferred to another location but they might be used by several companies simultaneously 
(Johnson, 2005). 
The final element of the OLI framework – internalisation, refers to the company’s decision to 
keep its firm-specific ownership advantages within the company and not to sell them, or the 
rights to use them, to another enterprise when transferring them abroad. The reasoning behind 
such a decision is due to three factors – risk and uncertainty; firm’s ability to exploit 
economies of large-scale production; and the presence of external to the company transactions 
costs and benefits which are not specified between the parties in advance (Dunning, 1988) 
which is somehow related to the risk and uncertainty as well. 
Dunning (1988) also points out that ownership, location and internalisation advantages arise 
from structural and transactional market imperfections, i.e. when market are not perfect. 
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The OLI paradigm also allows many additional factors to be included in the analysis of firms’ 
choice to engage in FDI. The additional variable influencing companies’ decisions may be 
listed as country-specific, industry-specific and firm-specific. Countries specific variables 
include factor endowments, government policy in the field of economy and tax regulations, 
etc. Industry-specific variables relate to the technological and other features typical for the 
sector in which firms operate. Dunning (1988) points that it is much difficult for the firm-
specific variables to be captured but also not impossible. He argues that despite the obvious 
differences between the firms there are similarities referring to the fact that they have “broadly 
similar goals” (p.7) and they act in a rational and consistent way trying to achieve them. 
A closely related to Dunning’s OLI framework concept is the one of “knowledge-based, firm-
specific assets” ( p.174, Markusen, 1995). Markusen’s argument is based on the evidence that 
industries which tend to have a large proportion of multinational enterprises usually are 
characterized by high levels of research and development and marketing expenditures and high 
proportion of workers with scientific and technical knowledge. In addition the produced goods 
are relatively new and advanced and the product differentiation is the leading strategy. Based 
on this Markusen argues that the important determinants of FDI in such industries are 
knowledge-based assets, such as human capital, patents, trademarks, blueprints, knowledge, 
management skills, reputation, etc. It is much cheaper to transfer these assets in a foreign 
location in comparison with physical capital transfers and there is no reduction of there 
profitability in all locations of firms’ activities. Because of the easy and cheap transferability of 
the knowledge-based assets they give an inherent advantage of multinational companies over 
the single plant domestic firms, because MNCs can use them in different locations without 
further investment and all single plant domestic firms should invest in order to create such 
assets on their own.  
In addition, Dunning introduces the concept of Investment development path (IDP), also based 
on the assumptions of OLI framework (Dunning, 1988). This concept deals with the dynamic 
aspect of FDI. The basic proposition of IDP is that country’s position as a net recipient or 
donor of FDI depends on “(i) its stage of economic development, (ii) the structure of its factor 
endowments and markets, (iii) its political and economic systems, and (iv) the nature and extent 
of market failure in the transaction of intermediate products across national boundaries.” (p. 15). 
Put shortly, a country’s inward and outward investments position depends on its level of economic 
development relative to the rest of the world. According to Dunning and Narula (1996) as the 
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economic development advances the country moves through five different stages and in each stage 
country’s position as a recipient and donor of FDI changes according to “the extent and pattern of 
the competitive or ownership specific (O) advantages of the indigenous firms of the countries 
concerned relative to those of firms of other countries; the competitiveness of location-bound 
resources and capabilities of that country, relative to those of other countries (the L specific 
advantages of that country); and the extent to which indigenous and foreign firms choose to utilize 
their O specific advantages jointly with the location bound endowments of home or foreign 
countries through internalizing the cross-border market for these advantages, rather than some 
other organizational route (i.e. their perceived I advantages)” (p.1).  
In the first stage, countries cannot offer location specific advantages apart from natural resources 
that they might possess to investors and thus they receive very limited mount of FDI. At this stage 
markets are small with no good perspectives for growing, infrastructure is of poor quality, 
government policies and economic systems are inadequate, labour force is poorly educated and 
trained. Because of these, foreign firms choose to serve the markets of the countries in the first 
stage of IDP through exports or through non-equity arrangements with domestic firms because the 
ownership advantages of domestic firms are very few and the ones that exist are in labour-intensive 
manufacturing sector and primary sector. Governments’ involvement in policies aiming at 
overcoming countries’ deficiencies is only limited. In the second stage inward FDI starts to grow 
while outward FDI stays quite limited. Inward FDI grows due to increase either in the size or in the 
purchasing capacity of the market. Very often at this stage inward FDI is import substituting and 
due to tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. Depending on the development strategy and 
improvements in infrastructure countries might be able to attract also export-oriented FDI. At this 
stage production moves from labour-intensive industries towards semi-skilled and moderately 
knowledge intensive consumer goods production. Outward FDI that emerges are mainly market- 
seeking and strategic-asset-seeking types. The growth rate of inward FDI is much higher than the 
growth rate of outward FDI thus net inward investment increases. As approaching the end of the 
second stage the growth rates of inward and outward investment will start converging. 
In the third stage of IDP the growth rate of inward FDI starts to slow down and the growth rate of 
outward FDI starts increasing. As the technological development of a country advances, 
production shifts to more standardized goods. At this stage wages increases, consumers begin to 
require higher quality goods and countries’ comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries 
deteriorates. Importance of the initial ownership advantages of the direct investor vanishes as 
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domestic firms gain their own competitive advantages and compete with foreign firms in the same 
sectors. The level of education, training and innovatory activities in the country increases. 
Ownership advantages of foreign firms shift towards technological, managerial and marketing 
innovations. Growing location advantages stemming from created assets and enlarged market will 
be a prerequisite for the shift of production towards more technology-intensive manufacturing and 
higher value-added production. The motives for inward FDI at this stage are efficiency-seeking and 
strategic-assets-seeking in industries where domestic firms have gained competitive advantages. 
Outward FDI are directed to countries at stages one and two of IDP and it is mainly with market-
seeking and exports oriented character. Outward FDI is also directed to countries at stages three 
and four with the goal to acquire strategic assets to strengthen ownership advantages of domestic 
firms. Governments’ efforts at this stage aim at encouraging inward FDI in industries where 
domestic firms ownership advantages are the weakest and location-bound advantages of the 
country are the strongest. Logically, governments will encourage outward FDI in the sectors where 
ownership advantages are the strongest and location advantages are the weakest. 
The fourth stage is reached when a country’s outward FDI stocks equals to or exceeds inward FDI 
stocks and the growth rate of outward FDI is still higher than the growth rate of inward FDI. At this 
stage domestic firms have developed competitive advantages so that they compete successfully 
with foreign firms not only in their own country but also in foreign markets. As the cost of capital 
is lower than the cost of labour, capital-intensive industries will dominate the national production 
structure. At this stage location advantages are based mainly on created assets. Inward FDI comes 
mostly from other countries at stage four with asset-seeking goal. There may be a little proportion 
of market-seeking FDI coming from countries at lower stages of IDP. Outward FDI will continue 
growing as firms relocate part of their activities offshore in order to maintain their competitiveness 
which would decrease if they keep their activities in the home country. Another reason for outward 
FDI is to overcome trade barriers installed by countries at all stages of IDP. The propensity of 
domestic firms to internalize their ownership advantages will lead to further increase in outward 
FDI. Since the ownership advantages of countries at stage four are broadly similar, intra-industry 
trade gains importance and both inter- and intra-industry trade tend to be conducted within MNCs. 
Governments’ policy is directed to structural adjustment of the location-bound advantages and 
technological capabilities, and reducing transaction costs of economic activity and facilitating 
markets to operate efficiently. 
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When countries enter the fifth stage they settle down to a fluctuating equilibrium with roughly 
equal amounts of inward and outward FDI while both are rising in value. Inward FDI will come 
mainly from countries at lower stages of IDP in the form of market-seeking and knowledge- 
seeking FDI, and from countries at stage four and five with firms trying to further rationalise their 
production activities by spreading them among different locations. In this stage no country will 
have location bound created assets which are essentially better than those of other countries at stage 
five. However, the relative attraction of a particular location will depend mainly on created assets. 
The abilities of a country to upgrade its technological and human capabilities are a function of its 
factor endowments, markets characteristics and strategies of its government. Thus the role of 
governments cannot be neglected, though it cannot be overstated either. The ownership advantages 
of companies are less dependent on their home countries natural resources, and getting more and 
more dependent on firms’ ability to acquire assets and fully exploit the advantages of internalizing 
their activities through cross-border governance emphasizing on cross-border alliances, mergers 
and acquisitions. Nationalities of MNCs will become more and more blurred.  
A concluding remark of the theory chapter of Dunning and Narula’s book (1996) is that after a 
certain point the absolute size of the GDP of a country is not a reliable guide for its competitiveness 
and net investment position. This is because the rate and characteristics of growth of a country 
relative to its main competitors is what matters. In addition, since the motivation of FDI shifts from 
exploitation of existing ownership assets to creation of new ones, it is the countries which offer 
location-bound resources for creation of such assets that will gain competitive advantage.  
5.2. Agglomeration forces as a shaping factor for companies location decisions – “new 
economic geography” theory. 
Another theory related to location decisions of MNCs is the “new economic geography” 
introduced with its current statements by Paul Krugman in his paper from 1991. In his initial 
work Krugman (1991) ends his research up to the point where manufacturing is concentrated 
in one region and agricultural production is left in the periphery region. In his later work 
together with Venables (1995) he expands the analysis beyond this point.  
According to Krugman and Venables (1995) there are certain forces appearing at different 
levels of transport and trade costs which contributes to a great extent to concentration of 
production activities of firms in a certain location. The argument is built on the existence of 
two regions – North and South which are identical in endowments, preferences and 
  
 
22 
technology. Each region produces two kinds of goods – agricultural goods which are produced 
with constant returns to scale and employ extensively immobile production factors, i.e. land 
(Krugman, 1991), and manufactured goods which are produced with increasing returns to scale 
and limited use of immobile factors (Krugman, 1991). The manufacturing sectors in both 
countries can produce two types of goods – final goods sold to the final consumers, and 
intermediate goods sold for production inputs to other firms. Key assumptions of the model are 
increasing returns to scale, the presence of transport costs at different levels (Krugman and 
Venables, 1995), high proportion of income spent on manufacturing goods (Krugman, 1991). 
When transport costs are very high each economy is self sufficient and produces both 
agricultural and manufactured goods. There is no international trade and no specialization. 
When transport costs decline gradually international trade occurs. At some point a certain 
process arise leading to a regional differentiation because for some reasons the manufacturing 
sector in one region becomes bigger than the manufacturing sector in the other region. As a 
result two kinds of pecuniary externalities will occur. Larger manufacturing sector in one 
region means larger market for intermediate manufactured goods which makes this location 
more attractive for the producers of manufactured goods. This is an example of backward 
linkages. On the other hand, better access to intermediate manufactured goods of the firms in 
this region will lower production costs of final manufactured goods which will lead to a further 
shift of manufacturing firms to this region, which is an example of forward linkages.  
As a result of the self-reinforcing backward and forward linkages, the demand for labour in the 
industrialized region increases while the demand for labour in the other region employed 
mainly in agricultural production decreases. This will lead to a rise in wages in the 
industrialized core region and a decline in wages in the agricultural periphery region. Thus 
economic integration will lead to uneven development. 
But as transport costs continue to fall the importance of being close to markets and suppliers 
will decline. At the same time the periphery region will be gaining advantage over the core 
region by offering lower labour costs. After a certain point sufficiently low transport costs and 
wage differential will more than offset the disadvantage of the periphery region of being 
remote from the markets and suppliers in the core region. When this happens, manufacturing 
firms will have incentives to move from the core to the periphery region, forcing a 
convergence in real wages. 
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The model presented above is a general equilibrium model so each firm must compete in two 
fronts – with foreign firms in the same industry for markets and with domestic firms for inputs 
(Krugman and Venables, 1995). 
In general, there are three main reasons for agglomeration: 
- the concentration of several firms in a single location creates a market for workers with 
industry-specific skills meaning that the probability for both unemployment and labour 
shortage decrease; 
- industries which locate in one site offer opportunities for production and respectively 
consumption of non-tradable inputs; 
- informational spillover can contribute to clustered firms having better production functions 
than isolated ones (Krugman, 1991). 
At the presence of transport costs rising with distance and scale economies at plant and 
corporate level, firms are confronted with the so called proximity-concentration trade-off. 
When expanding their activities abroad companies must choose whether to do so via exporting 
or via direct investment choosing between proximity advantages and scale advantages based 
on concentration of production activities (Brainard, 1993). Brainard (1997) shows that “firms 
are more likely to expand production horizontally across borders the higher are transport costs 
and trade barriers and the lower are investment barriers and the size of scale economies at the 
plant level relative to the corporate level” (p. 521). On the other hand, the traditional rationale 
for multinational activities as vertical expansion due to factor price differentials and 
differences in factor endowments also holds (Brainard, 1993). 
5.3. Horizontal and Vertical FDI determinants 
Motivation for undertaking HFDI is quite different from motivation to undertake VFDI. 
When firms decide to invest abroad, i.e. to become MNCs or to expand their operations 
abroad, a number of possible gains and losses should be considered. Thus determinants of 
FDI will have different importance regarding horizontal and vertical FDI.  
The most important determinants according to Navaretti and Venables (2004) are summarized 
in the following table: 
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Table 5: Determinants of HFDI and VFDI 
Prediction by type of 
investment Determinants 
HFDI VFDI 
Determinants relate to types of firms or industries   
Firm-lever economies of scale + + 
Plant-level economies of scale - ? 
Product-specific trade costs + - 
Costs to disintegrate stages of production - - 
Difference in factor intensity between stages of production ? + 
Determinants relate to types of countries   
Trade costs (distance, trade barriers, etc.) + - 
Market size + ? 
Factor cost differentials ? + 
Source: Navaretti and Venables (2004, p.31) 
One important distinction here is between firm-level and plant level economies of scale. Firm-
level economies of scales refer to firm-level assets which can be tangible or intangible. 
Intangible firm-level assets might be management practices, production technologies, 
reputation, brand name, patents, etc. Headquarters personnel and office buildings can be 
referred as firm-level tangible assets. Some of them can be applied in different locations 
without losing any of their value for the firm like production technology, management skills, 
etc. Others serve the activities of the entire company – doubling company’s activities does not 
necessarily means that headquarter personnel should be doubled. Having such firm-level 
assets allows companies to realise firm-level economies of scales because it is not necessary 
when expanding operations abroad to replicate these assets and activities everywhere. These 
firm-level economies of scale are the basis for undertaking both horizontal and vertical FDI. 
When undertaking HFDI by duplicating some of the activities abroad companies forsake the 
economies of scale realised at plant level because production costs are not split among all the 
units produced by the company. However, some plant-level economies of scale might be 
realised when VFDI occur – in the case that all activities at a certain production stage are 
concentrated in one location. 
Usually HFDI are undertaken in order big and affluent markets to be reached when it is not 
efficient to serve them through export because of high trade costs and barriers. Thus trade 
costs and HFDI are positively correlated. On the other hand, the correlation between product-
specific trade costs and VFDI is negative since it is expensive to transfer intermediate goods 
at different stages of production process between different locations in different countries. 
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Disintegration costs include all the costs related to transferring the intermediate and final 
goods between the locations of the consecutive production stages. These costs include 
transportation costs, packing and unpacking costs, costs due to the time of transportation, 
depreciation, decrease of the value of the goods, etc. Somehow abstract but also very 
important are the costs related to the loss of efficiency due to disintegration of the production 
process. Navaretti and Venables (2004) give the example of processing of steel where during 
the entire process the steel is kept warm. If part of the process is set up in another country 
then the steel should be cooled down, transported and then heated again. 
In order VFDI to be undertaken it is necessary that different stages of the production process 
have different factor intensities. Only in this case it is justified different stages to be located in 
different countries in order to be taken advantage of different factor costs. If all stages have 
the same factor intensity, separating them in different locations will create no advantage for 
the company.  
Determinants listed above are related to the characteristics of the firms or industries. Country-
specific determinants, on the other hand, include trade costs, market size and factor cost 
differentials. As I already mentioned trade costs are positively correlated with HFDI and 
negatively correlated with VFDI. Market size is very important determinant when it comes to 
HFDI but its effect on VFDI is ambiguous. In addition factor costs differentials have a strong 
positive effect on VFDI and not such a profound one on HFDI.  
It is generally referred to the difference in factor costs as a main determinant of FDI. 
Although sometimes this is the case, in other cases other determinants are more important and 
crucial. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many research papers exist dedicated to different aspects of FDI. In general research areas 
regarding FDI which are relevant to the thesis can be classified in three broad areas – studies 
related to determinants of FDI, research papers concerning the specific determinants of FDI 
relevant for transition countries, and studies on host country effects of FDI. They all contain 
valuable information and empirical results. Thus, I revisit them in order to get insights and 
guiding points.  
1. Review of the literature on determinants of FDI 
The question about determinants of FDI has been widely discussed because of the importance 
that direct investment gained during the passed decades in the world economy. Many studies 
exist which deal with factors attracting and encouraging FDI. These studies use different data 
and research methods, have their limitations but they also are a valuable source for any further 
research.  
During the last couple of decades, the focus of researchers’ attention has switched from 
traditional determinants of FDI like market size, growth potential and factor costs, which have 
more or less unambiguous effects on FDI when taking into account the particular type and 
purpose of the direct investment (see for example Navaretti and Venables, 2004), to more 
complex to quantify and measure determinants like democracy, institutions, corruption and 
economic integration. The articles reviewed in the current section are focused on the latter 
group of determinants.  
For example, Motta and Norman (1996) model the impact of economic integration on 
oligopolistic foreign direct investment activities and international trade in their attempt to give 
explanation to the boom of FDI in the three major regional blocks – the European Union 
(EU), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the beginning of 1990s. Their analysis is based on the game-
theoretic models of FDI and includes three countries with equal sizes, identical consumers 
and homogeneous products, one firm in each country with identical production costs and 
formation of a regional block between two of the countries. The creation of regional 
integration agreement (RIA) is likely to lead to improvement of intra-regional market 
accessibility, i.e. reduction in intra-region tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, and maybe to a 
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coordinated extra-regional trade policy, but not necessarily leading to increase in extra-
regional barriers. Their analysis shows that improvement of market accessibility by lowering 
or removing tariff and non-tariff trade barriers between countries in the regional block has 
greater impact on attracting FDI into the area than raising the external barriers. It is also 
shown that whether there will be a net increase in FDI in the regional block as a whole 
depends on the previous existence of FDI in the area, because lowering of the internal trade 
barriers may lead to concentration of previously dispersed FDI into the most efficient location 
and servicing the rest of the countries via exports. 
Te Velte and Bezemer (2006) also examine the relations between regional integration (RI) 
and FDI in developing countries but their approach is empirical. They use data for the real 
stock of FDI of USA and GB in developing countries for the period 1980-2001, since these 
two countries are among the biggest investors.  They argue that whether or not regional 
integration agreements (RIAs) leads to  further extra- and intra-regional FDI depends on the 
type of FDI – horizontal or vertical, and on the purpose of FDI – market-seeking or 
efficiency-seeking. In particular, their model includes traditional explanatory variables for 
FDI in developing countries such as market size and growth potential, infrastructure and 
human capital. They use a separate variable for the specific investment provisions which 
would boost FDI. In order to capture differences among countries they evaluate the relative 
positions of all countries included in the research. The purpose is to determine whether 
countries with different sizes, levels of productivity and wealth, located at different distances 
from the core countries attract different amounts of FDI and exactly which types of RIAs lead 
to increase in FDI. Their findings show that not all RIAs lead to further increase of FDI but 
only those which include certain investment and trade provisions which are enough to 
guarantee stable and predictable investment climate. They also find that smaller countries and 
the ones located further away from the core, represented by the largest country in the region, 
receive less FDI than the bigger countries and the countries located near the core. 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002) focus on the research of the impact of corruption level both in 
host and home country on FDI flows. They use data for the period 1996-1998 covering 
eighty-nine countries comprising developed, developing and transition countries. They show 
that the perceived corruption level in the host country as measured by Corruption Perception 
Index produced by Transparency International has a negative effect on FDI. In addition, this 
negative effect is persistent even when Transparency International is present in the country 
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and when political stability is achieved (high levels of corruption are generally associated 
with political instability). Habib and Zurawicki also find out that with increasing of the 
absolute difference in the corruption levels between couples of countries FDI flows between 
them in either direction (from the less corrupt to the more corrupt country and vice versa) 
diminish. This is a result from the difficulty that firms experience from operating in an 
administratively distant environment. 
Jensen (2004) explores the impact of signing an agreement with IMF on FDI inflows using 
data for sixty-eight countries for the period 1968-2000. His conclusion is striking because it is 
strictly opposite to the conventional belief that IMF agreements should have positive effect on 
FDI inflows. Jensen finds out that this effect is negative and estimates that, after controlling 
for the presence of financial crises as a main reason for signing agreements with IMF, it 
amounts to 25 % decrease in FDI inflows relative to countries which do not have such 
agreements. According to him this is due mainly to the ambiguous effect that agreements with 
IMF have on the macroeconomic performance and political stability in the country which 
receives the funding.  
In his earlier research, Jensen (2003) also explores the impact of democracy and democratic 
political institutions on FDI inflows covering one hundred and fourteen countries and using 
data for the 1980s and 1990s. Jensen estimates that countries with democratic governments 
attract on average 70 % more FDI as a percentage of GDP, after controlling for other political 
and economic factors. Jensen explains this result by the fact that once an investment has been 
done it becomes illiquid and immobile and therefore represents a sunk-cost. Moreover, MNCs 
business operations in a particular country are highly dependent on decisions which political 
institutions are making. Among those decisions, the most important are the ones concerning 
nationalization and expropriation of ownership and revenues, tax rates, tariff rates, 
depreciation schedules and others regarding political stability and credibility of political 
regimes. There are a number of mechanisms which help preventing drastic change in 
governments’ policy, e.g. political players with veto authorization, electoral costs related to 
change of governments after elections, etc. 
2. Review of the literature on determinants of FDI in transition countries 
Alongside with analysing specific determinants of FDI relevant for transition economies, 
most of the quantitative papers dedicated to them also deal with traditional determinants with 
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strictly similar results with only one exception among the revisited papers – the research of 
Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay and Zettelmeyer (2001). Most of the studies investigate FDI 
determinants in CEECs.  Several studies enrich their results by comparing the determinants 
relevant for CEECs with FDI determinants having impact on Latin American countries 
(Campos and Kinoshita, 2008) or by comparing groups of transition economies (Campos and 
Kinoshita, 2003). Two studies use methodology which is not typical for economics research 
papers – Bandelj (2002) who is using relational approach which is widely used in economic 
sociology and Altomonte (2000) who is using option theory to model influence of FDI 
determinants.  
For example, Janicki and Wunnava (2004) take a rather conventional approach in exploring 
the main determinants of FDI flows from the fifteen older members of EU4 into nine, 
perspective in 1997, candidates for accession countries5. They confirm the greater degree of 
openness to trade, larger market size, lower labour costs and lower country risk, as measured 
by the Institutional Investor country risk rating6, to be the most important factors influencing 
the FDI inflows to CEECs originating from older EU member states. Janicki and Wunnava 
(2004) estimate the level of factors influence: an increase of 1 % in the import between source 
and receiving countries (a proxy for trade openness) leads to $140.28 million increase in FDI 
inflows for each specific country; $1 change in annual wage difference in manufacturing 
sector between donor and recipient country (a proxy for labour costs) leads to a change of $17 
278 of FDI; and one unit improvement in credit rating leads to an increase of FDI in the host 
country with $10.315 million.  
However, most of the existing research papers concentrate on more specific determinants of 
FDI in transition economies. For example, Majocchi and Strange (2007) explore the effect of 
market, trade and financial liberalization as well as openness of domestic bank industry in the 
sense of presence of foreign banks. They argue that market, trade and financial liberalization 
all have positive impact on attracting FDI to transition countries though with different 
magnitude. The most important is trade liberalization and all three types of liberalization seem 
to be more important to manufacturing firms. According to Majocchi and Strange (2007), the 
presence of many transnational banks in domestic bank industry has a negative effect on FDI 
                                                 
4 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom 
5 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Ukraine 
6 http://www.worldbank.org/fandd/english/0397/articles/020397.htm 
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inflows. They also show that other factors such as market size and potential, the quality of 
infrastructure, the availability of labour and agglomeration economies have positive effect on 
attracting FDI. However their research has certain limitations because it is based on firm level 
data regarding small and middle size (SME) Italian enterprises. On the one hand, they haven’t 
needed to control for cultural and geographical proximity since the SME originate from one 
country. On the other hand, the scope of their research is limited since it is investigating only 
SME. For example it is quite possible that at least one of their findings is not relevant for 
MNCs, i.e. the negative impact of the presence of many transnational banks in domestic bank 
industry. It is likely that MNCs would not face the same difficulty as SME when raising 
capital in domestic financial market because presumably their activities are assumed as less 
risky compared to the activities of SME. 
Bevan and Estrin (Bevan, Estrin and Grabbe, 2001) examine the impact of announcement of 
decisions regarding eastward enlargement of EU on the level of FDI into candidate countries 
from CEE. They find out, after controlling for all other factors influencing investment 
decisions, that the public announcement of commitment to eastward enlargement made by the 
EU member in 1994 actually led to an increase of FDI inflows to the front-runner candidate 
countries (Check Republic, Hungary and Poland). They also point that the decision of EU 
members to open negotiations for accession with five countries in 1997 (Check Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) and all further progress announcements have lead to 
a further increase in FDI flows to these leading countries. Their findings are in line with 
existing literature exploring the impact of international and regional integration on FDI.  
In addition, Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004) test the importance of international 
integration, measured by the percentages of exports and trade to GDP, and quality of 
institutions, measured by the indices of political rights, civil liberties, freedom of press and 
Transparency International corruption index, as factors influencing the distribution of FDI 
among economies in transition. Their research covers a period of five years and twelve CEE 
transition countries. Their findings confirm the widespread belief that market size, measured 
by the GDP per capita with one year lag, and internalisation, i.e. international integration 
influence to a large extent MNCs decision to undertake investment in a certain host country. 
Nevertheless, they also find out that even not influencing to a great extent FDI flows, 
institutions are far from having no impact. Moreover, they find that “the better the civil rights 
level of a country, the more positive is the impact of an increase in per capita income on FDI” 
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(p. 89). More general, their findings confirm that better quality institutions enhance to a great 
extent the ability of countries to attract FDI. Countries with more freedom in economic 
activities, lower corruption, stricter application of rule of law, less bureaucracy and stronger 
property rights protection perform better and are more attractive to investors than countries 
suffering form serious deficiencies in the mentioned areas. 
In his research, Cass (2007) argues that employment of investment incentives and Investment 
promotion agencies (IPAs) activities in order to support and encourage inward FDI is widely 
spread among Central and Eastern European countries. Cass’s analysis is mainly qualitative 
examining the level of offered investment incentives and the extent of IPAs activities. He 
finds out that contrary to the most logical prediction that incentives and IPAs activity should 
be widely used in the beginning of transition process in order to compensate for the lack of 
political and macroeconomic stability, they are in general employed in later stages of 
transition process when counties actually have improved conditions which might attract 
investors. Investment incentives are offered irrespective of the changes in tax system and 
overall lowering of tax rates. IPAs activities are divided in four major categories: investor 
services, image building, investment generation and policy advocacy. However, most IPAs 
perform mainly investor services activities. His findings are important, because investment 
incentives and IPAs activities play important role in attracting FDI. It is also worth to point 
out that different countries advanced with different speed in the transition process. Thus, the 
importance and therefore practical results of investment incentives and IPAs activities has 
been growing and has reached its peak at different points of time for the different countries. In 
this line of reasoning, increase of FDI in transition countries may appear in different times 
also due to investment incentives and IPAs activities.  
In their research, focused mainly on the relation between structural reforms and FDI, Campos 
and Kinoshita (2008) use panel data for nineteen Latin American and twenty-five transition 
economies for the period 1989-2004. They argue that successful implementation of structural 
reforms by governments plays the role of a signal to investors of decreasing investment risk. 
Moreover, structural reforms improve the conditions in which foreign investors operate in 
host countries. More precisely, reform of financial sector determined as an effort rather than 
an outcome influences investors’ decision about undertaking FDI to a much larger extent than 
privatization and trade liberalization. Privatization is still an important determinant of FDI 
with greater influence for Latin American countries. From institutional factors the one with 
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greater importance is the quality of bureaucracy, while rule of law plays a role in attracting 
FDI only in Latin American countries, and all traditional determinants like market size, factor 
endowments, macroeconomic stability and quality infrastructure have a positive impact on 
investment decisions of MNCs. According to Campos and Kinoshita (2008), the explanation 
for the greatest importance of financial sector reforms is that they are a prerequisite for 
maximization of spillover effects from backward linkages to international investors, meaning 
that it is not very likely that MNCs will search from financing at local financial markets but 
availability of capital will allow domestic suppliers to invest further in improvements of 
productivity level and quality of intermediate inputs and thus leading to benefits for foreign 
investors. 
In their earlier research based on panel data from twenty-five transition economies from 
Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of independent states (CIS) and Baltic States 
for the period 1990-1998, Campos and Kinoshita (2003) find differences regarding variables 
determining FDI inflows for the various groups of countries. They point out the evidence that 
all types of FDI are present in the region, which is to confirm that all traditional determinants 
of FDI like market size, lower labour costs and resource abundance have great importance. 
The quality of institutions, reforms and policy also turn out to be very strong determinants for 
all countries. More precisely, greater trade liberalization, good system of law and law 
enforcement, high quality bureaucracy and fewer restrictions on FDI enhance inward FDI. 
Agglomeration economies are also a key factor.  However, for the non-CIS countries the most 
important determinants of FDI appear to be agglomeration economies and institutions, which 
is explained by the fact that in these countries the predominant sector receiving foreign 
capitals is manufacturing which typically is characterized by presence and possibilities to take 
advantage of spillovers. As for the CIS countries, where FDI goes predominantly to the 
resource sector, natural resource abundance and quality infrastructure are the crucial factors. 
Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay and Zettelmeyer (2001) have conducted a similar research to Campos 
and Kinoshita’s ones. Garibaldi et al.’s research (2001) covers twenty-six transition 
economies and encompasses the years from the early stage of transition (1990 to 1992 with 
variations among countries) up to 1999. They find out that good economic performance, 
measured by high fiscal balance and high growth, greater economic liberalization, successful 
reforms in the area of trade liberalization, natural resource abundance and fixed or stable 
exchange rate regime increase FDI inflows. These results are broadly similar with previous 
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research. Other key factors are method of privatization and restrictions to FDI, with direct 
sales as a main privatization method having positive and the presence of restrictions having 
negative impact. What is surprising in the findings is the fact that low inflation rate as a proxy 
for macroeconomic stability and low wage rate as a proxy for the competitiveness of countries 
are not significant determinants of FDI inflows. Another surprising finding is that institutional 
determinants have rather negligible influence on FDI with only bureaucratic obstacles to 
investment and entrepreneurship having important and negative impact on attracting FDI. In 
addition, researchers find out that investors’ perception of risk and attractiveness of countries 
as recipients of FDI, as expressed by investor magazine ratings, have predictable power larger 
than expected based on the included economic indicators. This indicates that investors use 
such ratings as a proxy for fundamental indicators that determine the decision of undertaking 
FDI when information about these indicators is not readily available and that market 
perceptions which are not based on these fundamental factors influence investors’ decisions. 
Holland and Pain (1998) use data from eleven CEECs for the period 1992-1996 in order to 
determine the main factors influencing investment decisions in those countries as well as the 
host country effects. They find out that privatization method and perceptions of risk are 
important yet correlated determinants. The employment of direct-sales method of 
privatization affects positively FDI inflows as well as lower level of perceived risks. Among 
other factors that influence investment decisions according to their research are proximity to 
larger markets of the EU members, relative labour costs and past trade linkages, the latter one 
used as a source of decreasing unfamiliarity and uncertainty regarding host countries markets. 
Macroeconomic stability also is a crucial factor in shaping investors’ decisions which is 
consistent with most of other existing research work. 
Demekas, Horváth, Ribakova and Wu (2005) concentrate their research on the FDI flows to 
South-eastern European in order to determine the most important factors for attraction FDI 
inflows and to what extent government policy can influence positively incoming investment 
flows. They argue that market size and geographical and cultural proximity between source 
and host countries have the greatest positive impact in attraction FDI by transition economies. 
But policy environment also matters. High corporate tax rates, high labour costs and high 
levels of import tariffs repel FDI and quality infrastructure and trade and foreign exchange 
liberalization attract FDI. In addition, tax holidays and corruption do not have direct impact 
on capital inflows but they affect FDI indirectly by shaping the business environment in host 
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countries. In addition, they find out that below the threshold level of 12% of non-privatization 
related FDI to GDP, determinants like market size, proximity and labour costs matter the most 
to foreign investors and after this level host countries prosperity, institutional factors and 
quality of business environment gain greater importance. They explain this finding by the 
changing nature of FDI as the host country attracts larger amounts of FDI, and changing 
motives for investing. They also argue that FDI becomes fairly immune to risk and distortions 
once investor-friendly economic and legal environment is established after the initial stage of 
attracting FDI. 
Bandelj (2002) takes a rather interesting perspective in examining the determinants of FDI in 
CEECs. Her research encompasses eleven transition economies from the region as recipients 
of FDI and twenty-seven investor countries including the biggest investors in the world and 
the biggest investors in the region for the period 1995-1997. Bandelj argues that social 
embedded factors like institutional arrangements, political alliances, personal and business 
networks and cultural ties between investor and host countries determine FDI flows into 
CEECs to a much greater extent than traditional determinants like market size, political 
stability and the policy towards FDI. In particular, she shows that political alliances as proxy 
by official government aid from the donor country to the recipient country, personal and 
business networks as proxy by long-term immigration from host to investing countries and 
pre-existing business ties between countries expressed by the level of export from investing to 
host country respectively, and cultural ties as proxy by national non-immigrant minorities in 
host and investing countries, determine to a great extent the volume of FDI inflows. On the 
other hand, market size, political stability and FDI policy have a limited explanatory power 
regarding FDI decisions which is dependent on overall investment level of the country of 
origin. As of institutional arrangements as proxy by bilateral investment treaties and European 
Union agreements, the results of research show that standardization of the institutional 
environment between countries is not of significant importance when investing countries 
characteristics are taken into consideration. 
Another interesting research paper taking a somehow unusual perspective towards FDI 
determinants in transition economies is the one by Altomonte (2000). He employs the real 
option theory in modelling factors influencing direct investment decisions. According to his 
research results, along with traditional determinants derived from OLI framework (market 
size and demand and relative labour costs; distance is not a factor with significant importance 
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in his model) investors’ perception of uncertainty, underlying volatility of economy and 
irreversibility of investment are all important determinants of FDI. Moreover, the subjective 
measure of investors’ expectations about uncertainty in the host economy as expressed by the 
general quality if business climate and the extent of giving nationals preferential treatment, is 
the more important variable measuring institutional framework of the host country than the 
objective variable measuring the mere content of local institutional environment with the 
latter having turned out not statistically significant. Among other variables industry specific 
differences in sunk costs are an important determinant of FDI while underlying volatility of 
host economy as measured by the standard deviation of production indices in manufacturing 
industries in host countries have turned out not strongly significant, probably because it is 
associated with transition progress captured by other variables. 
To sum up, despite of the differences in their focus and methodology, the reviewed studies do 
not produce contradictory results. In general, liberalization, international integration, quality 
institutions, macroeconomic stability and growth, direct and transparent privatization, policy 
aiming at stabilization and encouragement of FDI which respectively decreases risk and 
uncertainty, and cultural proximity and familiarity are factors which have a positive effect on 
FDI in transition economies. 
3. Review of the literature on host country effects of FDI 
In general, the research papers dealing with the host country effects of FDI show that the 
overall effect is positive although there are differences in the reasoning why this is so and 
under what form this positive impact takes place. 
Rutkowski (2006) examines the effect of FDI on the competition and concentration of the 
host country industries in transition economies. He has expected the impact of FDI to be 
significant because large MNCs enter the market bringing their unique skills and resources, 
with clear technological and organizational advantage over the smaller and recently 
established (and therefore lacking market experience) domestic competitors. These firm-
specific skills and resources may easily lead to strategic advantages. It is also likely that 
MNCs, which have access to broad international financial resources, will take over more 
efficient domestic firms. In this way only less efficient firms will stay in local possession 
leading to MNCs being overall more efficient and competitive than local firms. Furthermore 
by taking away market shares from domestic firms, MNCs may force them to produce in less 
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efficient production scales. At the same time the unique knowledge of domestic firms about 
local market becomes less important in competing with foreign entrants as these transition 
countries integrate with developed countries and harmonize their business environments with 
the old EU members. This also means that the liability of foreignness becomes smaller.  
In order to examine the impact of FDI on the level of host country competition Rutkowski 
(2006) applies linear and non-linear regression models to evaluate the relationship between 
foreign presence and concentration across industries as well the profitability of domestic firms 
using data for thirteen CEECs. He finds out that FDI actually strengthens domestic enterprises 
and reduces concentration in industries. More precisely “a 1% rise in inward FDI stock/GDP 
ratio (which corresponds to an extra accumulation of FDI equal to approximately 0.2% of 
GDP) results in 2,2–4,9 % increase in the domestic profit/sales ratio. On the other hand, a 1% 
rise in inward FDI stock/GDP ratio reduced the probability of concentration by 15-29 %” (p. 
126). He also finds out that foreign investors respond positively to anticompetitive practices 
and labour legislation protecting employees, and that state-owned enterprises are generally 
less profitable. In general, spillovers seem to outweigh competitive impact of FDI and thus 
strengthening domestic firms.  
In addition, Javorcik (2004) examines the correlation between productivity of local firms and 
the presence of MNCs in downstream (potential customers) or upstream (potential suppliers 
of intermediate goods) sectors and across the same industry, and whether these productivity 
spillovers are determined by the extent of foreign ownership of affiliates. She uses firm-level 
panel data set from Lithuania for the period 1996-2000. Javorcik’s findings show that 
productivity spillovers from FDI take place through backward linkages, i.e. foreign affiliates 
sourcing from local suppliers. There is no evidence for productivity spillovers though 
horizontal or forward linkages. These findings can be explained by the determination of 
MNCs to prevent any knowledge, technology and other leakages to their local competitors 
and their willingness to support local suppliers from which they source outputs to improve 
their production and managerial techniques. According to Javorcik’s research “a one-
standard-deviation increase in the foreign presence in downstream sectors is associated with a 
15-percent rise in output of each domestic firm in the supplying industries” (p.625). It is 
found that these spillovers originate from affiliates with mixed capital structure, i.e. not fully 
owned foreign affiliates. This could be explained with the usage of previously established 
relations of the local partners with domestic suppliers and knowledge about the upstream 
  
 
37 
industry and the difficulty and high cost of establishing such relations on the side of MNCs 
and thus the inclination of fully owned subsidiaries to rely on import of intermediate goods.  
Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2002) also find similar results in their research based on plant-
level data about all United Kingdom manufacturing firms for the period 1973-1992. Unlike 
the previous study, they examine the influence of FDI coming from a number of developed 
countries into one of the most developed countries in economic perspective – the UK. Their 
results are broadly similar with the ones from the previous study – a 10 % increase in the 
foreign presence in an industry in the UK raises productivity in this industry by 0.5 %. The 
boost of productivity realizes only at industry but not on regional level. Haskel et al. (2002) 
also find that this productivity spillovers accrues mainly to plants which are smaller and are 
laggards in technological perspective and are less skilled intensive. They also find evidence 
that the presence of productivity increase depends on the source country of FDI - spillovers 
are significant for the US and French FDI, insignificant for German FDI and significantly 
negative for Japanese FDI. In addition, their research regarding four major FDI projects 
worldwide involving incentives granted by governments, show that in most cases the value of 
incentives per worker is greater than the increase in productivity at industry-level per worker. 
It is worth mentioning that they neglect the benefit for the society stemming from job 
creation. 
Holland and Pain (1998) also determine a positive effect from the presence of MNCs on 
productivity level in transition economies. However, their findings are strikingly different in 
explaining the cause of the raise in productivity. According to them “the main impact of 
foreign firms on the transition economies has arisen from the rapid growth in the number of 
such firms rather than from significant spillovers into the technologies and working practices 
of indigenous firms” (p.30) and thus differences in levels of education between different 
country do not have a significant impact on the absorptive capacity of domestic firms. It is 
though important to note that their data cover the period 1992-1996 and it is much likely that 
at a later stage of economic development of transition countries, the results of a similar 
research would be consistent with the findings from the research papers presented above.      
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IV. ANALYSIS PART– DETERMINANTS OF FDI 
INFLOWS TO BULGARIA 
1. Some additional facts about the  examined issue 
In order to gain understanding about the relative size of inward FDI to the economy of 
Bulgaria, a comparison between the country and the EU members from the previous wave of 
enlargement in 2004 and some neighbouring countries (including an applicant for accession in 
EU) has been made, which is presented in the graph below: 
Graph 1: FDI inflows, Millions of US $  
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Source: Annex table B.1., UNCTAD (2002, 2004, 2005, 2008). See data table in Annex 1. 
 
It can be seen from the graph that Bulgaria walked the way of transforming from a laggard 
into a leading country regarding FDI inflows. All of the leading countries – Check republic, 
Poland, Hungary and Slovakia made a huge progress in attracting FDI. But while the rest of 
the countries (including Romania which also manages to attract large amounts of FDI 
inflows) exhibit some kind of meandering pattern of increasing foreign investment, FDI into 
Bulgaria has been rising constantly with a large pace during the last five years. This fact 
supports the conclusion that Bulgaria currently is in the second stage of its Investment 
Development Path (IDP) with high rate of growth of inward FDI. In this stage, FDI is directed 
towards servicing the growing domestic market as well as establishing facilities for export-
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oriented activities. Investors are taking advantage of the abundance of skilled labour in the 
country (Dunning and Narula, 1995). 
However, it is difficult to judge how successful different CEECs have been in attracting FDI 
by looking only at the absolute value of the FDI inflows. Since these countries are quite 
different with respect of their size, it is worth presenting amounts of FDI inflows scaled by 
their relative size, measured by respective GDP indicators. 
Graph 2: FDI inflows as a percentage share of GDP 
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Source: Annex table B.1., UNCTAD (2002, 2004, 2005, 2008); http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/Saveshow.asp 
for GDP in Millions of US $ at prices and purchasing power parities (PPPs) of current year; author’s calculations 
It is obvious that Bulgaria and Estonia have managed to attract the largest inflows of FDI 
relative to their size. However, it would be difficult to compare these countries because FDI 
flows to the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are directed predominantly to the 
resource extracting industries (Kampos and Kinoshita, 2003). It is worth pointing that Croatia 
had been doing relatively great compared to the rest of the countries in the list in 1999, 2000 
and 2001. After a slowdown, direct investment to this country is again on the edge of 
acceleration, most likely due to its current negotiation for EU accession and the expected 
successful completion. 
2. The first decade of transition in Bulgaria (1990-2000): mistakes and lessons 
The first decade of transition turned out to be very difficult for Bulgaria for many reasons. 
The macroeconomic performance of the country was much weaker compared to the other 
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CEECs. The economic output declined significantly during the most years between 1990 and 
1997 reaching a cumulative decline of 37 % in 1997. The real GDP per capita fell far behind 
the rest of the countries in the region and inflation was always in high double and triple digits 
during 1990-1997 (IMF, 1999). 
While it is true that initial conditions in Bulgaria were far from favourable (high external and 
internal debt, heavily industrialized economy with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) most of 
which operating at a loss) and that the country was affected by many negative external shocks 
like the Yugoslav and gulf wars, the main reason for the lack of success in the early years of 
transition was the stop-and-go nature of stabilization policies and slow pace of structural 
reforms. There were certain efforts aiming at accelerating reforms but they failed to reach any 
results due to the lack of persistence in governments (IMF, 1999). 
The economic problems due to the lack of political will and determination for a successive 
implementation of reforms culminated in a severe banking and foreign exchange crisis at the 
end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997. As a result the output collapsed, the national currency 
depreciated severely and the inflation, which reached 240 % on a monthly basis, virtually 
wiped the savings of the population (IMF, 1999). 
A comparison between Bulgaria and some chosen Central and Eastern European economies is 
presented in Figure 1. It is obvious that as of 1997 Bulgaria was quite behind in its 
development relative to the rest of the countries. 
Figure 1: Bulgaria: international comparison, 1997 
 
Source: IMF (1999).  
Note: BGR – Bulgaria, CZE – Check republic, EST – Estonia, HUN – Hungary, LVA – Latvia, LTU – 
Lithuania, POL – Poland, ROM – Romania, SVK – Slovak republic, SVN - Slovenia 
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The crisis of 1996-1997 played the role of a painful wakening for the politicians and gave the 
start of radical, determined and fast-paced reforms which the country needed to be 
implemented half a decade earlier. The need for stabilization resulted in enforcement of 
Currency Board Arrangement on 1 July 1997 with the IMF support. The results were 
remarkable: inflation fell dramatically, the output started increasing virtually overnight, the 
confidence in the banking sector was restored (partially by selling a number of state owned 
banks to strategic investors (Kaminiski, 2006)) and a program of accelerated structural 
reforms was put in place (IMF, 1999). For the three years following the crises the real GDP 
grew by 11 % despite the negative impact of the global financial crises and the war in Kosovo 
(IMF, 2001). However, according to all economic indicators Bulgarian economy hit the 
bottom again during the Kosovo crisis and the output and exports started to recover in the 
middle of 1999 to reach the impressive increase during the 1998-2000 period on average 
(IMF, 2000).  
Figure 2: Bulgaria: indicators of progress, 1991-2000 
 
 
Source: IMF (2001) 
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Nevertheless, in 2000 the government and authorities still had many challenges to face if 
Bulgaria were to become a competitive international player and a EU member in further 
perspective. 
Figure 3: Macroeconomic indicators in selected EU accession countries, 1999 
 
Source: IMF (2001). 
The major part of structural reforms – the enterprise reform, was constantly delayed during 
the first years of transition. This was one of the main reasons for the substantial decline in the 
output. Immediately after the 1996-1997 crisis, advancement in structural reforms was made 
resulting mainly in privatization of small and medium enterprises (IMF, 1999). Afterwards, a 
huge progress in privatization was reached. 
2.1. Privatization process 1990-2000 
Until late 1996 the privatization process had been advancing very slowly. Virtually no 
progress had been achieved regarding privatization of large-scale SOEs in heavy industry, 
manufacturing and infrastructure. There had been several waves of accelerated privatization 
concerning small-scale enterprises which did not change the situation significantly. The lack 
of success was due to the bad coordination of privatization process with a few institutions 
responsible and involved, i.e. Privatization Agency (PA), the Centre for Mass Privatization 
(CMP) and the branch ministries. In addition, there was little interest on behalf of foreign 
strategic investors due to the macroeconomic instability and poor legislative framework (IMF, 
1999).  
Moreover, the first wave of privatization which started in 1996 was designed after the 
voucher privatization program applied in the Check republic. Approximately 75 million 
Bulgarian leva were distributed among citizens. This money were invested in privatization 
funds which afterwards bid for up to thirty percent ownership in mainly small and middle size 
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SOEs. By applying this method of privatization authorities basically cut off strategic foreign 
investors. In addition, according Bulgarian legislation at that time, possession of thirty-three 
percents of an enterprise was enough to block main decisions concerning the respective 
enterprise. Besides this, since 1994 The Transformation and Privatization of State-Owned and 
Municipal-Owned Enterprises Act gave clear advantages to manager-employee buyouts 
(MEBOs) in bidding for enterprises, especially regarding schedules of payments. Soon after 
that MEBOs proved largely inefficient because of the lack of confidence in them on behalf of 
the bank system and failure to provide necessary investment. Other obstacles in front of 
privatization were large-scale asset-stripping in SOEs, which resulted in reluctance to put 
enterprises on sale, inefficient accounting standards, which allowed for masking financial 
losses, and the lack of transparency of privatization procedures. (IMF, 1999). 
Increased awareness of costs of delayed privatization prompted acceleration in direct sales 
which resulted in boom of receipts in 1997. The year 1998 saw a further increase regarding 
the number of deals but a decline in the amount of proceeds. The second wave of privatization 
started in early 1999 and aimed at disposition of residual state shares in SOEs and cash 
privatization of large SOEs (IMF, 1999). As a result a record number of deals were concluded 
in 1999 resulting in 49 % share of privatized assets and 71 % of privatized assets excluding 
infrastructure. The major sales in non-financial sector included the oil refinery Neftochim, the 
steel giant Kremikovtsi, the fertilizer producer Agropolichim and Balkan airlines (IMF, 
2000). In 2000 amendments to Privatization law aiming at increasing transparency and 
efficiency were approved. In general, the pace of privatization slowed down during 2000 with 
the main achievement being disposition of residual state shares. The share of privatized assets 
reached 51 % and that of assets excluding infrastructure – 78 % (IMF, 2001). 
It is widely recognized that privatization is the main channel for attracting FDI in transition 
countries. Regarding this, all of the facts listed above turned Bulgaria into a laggard in 
receiving FDI during almost the entire decade, compared to its peers among CEECs applying 
for a membership in the EU.  
3. Bulgaria 2001-2007: Development of main factors attracting FDI 
3.1. Privatization 
It is widely recognized that one of the main channels for inward FDI to transition economies 
in Central and Eastern Europe has been privatization. At the beginning of transition virtually 
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all assets in these countries, including Bulgaria, were state-owned. The progress of 
privatization in Bulgaria has been quite uneven, which can be seen from the next table: 
Table 6: Percent of privatized assets in the total amount of the state-owned assets 
(balance values 31.12.1995)  
State bodies 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Privatization 
agency 
0.32 1.47 0.50 3.53 2.38 1.76 13.99 2.32 0.60 0.99 1.36 2,58 1,51 1,02 0,43 5,08 39,84 
All state 
bodies 
0.37 1.63 1.07 4.09 3.78 4.47 16.96 4.43 0.97 1.16 1.36 2,58 1,51 1,02 0,43 5,08 50,91 
Centre for 
mass 
privatization 
    14.58            14,58 
Total 0.37 1.63 1.07 4.09 18.36 4.47 16.96 4.43 0.97 1.16 1.36 2,58 1,51 1,02 0,43 5,08 65,49 
Source: Privatization Agency of Bulgaria. Derived on 15 April 2009 from 
http://priv.government.bg/apnew/Root/Files/stats/stats1405.htm. 
* The calculations are made from the data of 31.12.2008, according to the World Bank 
** Percent of the state-owned assets privatized is calculated towards the total balance value /580 mill/ 
As it was mentioned above, privatization process has reached two peaks – in 1997 (the first 
wave of privatization – the mass privatization) and in 1999 (the second wave of privatization 
– direct sales of large SOEs). After year 2000, the advancement has been quite modest with 
some evidence of acceleration in 2008. 
In 2002 the new Law on Privatization and Post-Privatization Control was adopted. According 
to it privatization of all remaining SOEs became centralized in the Privatization Agency. 
Another novelty was specification of the major methods to be employed in the privatization – 
public auctions and tenders, centralized public auctions and privatization through Bulgarian 
stock exchange – Sofia. The priorities of the privatization policy were set to be the rapid sale 
of remaining SOEs, guaranteeing transparency and openness of the privatization procedures 
and restructuring and privatization of the natural monopolies. With the new law, the post-
privatization activities were separated in another agency - Post-privatization Control Agency7.  
According to Bulgarian authorities, the goal of privatization is to transform SOEs into private 
property of foreign and Bulgarian investors. Thus, the information on the progress of 
privatization process and the share of privatized assets is not entirely reliable in evaluating the 
contribution of privatization to the significant increase of FDI inflows to Bulgaria after 2002. 
In order a more accurate analysis to be presented, I think that the value of cross-border M&As 
                                                 
7 http://priv.government.bg/apnew/Root/index.php?magic=0.56.1.1.2 
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is a good proxy for the FDI going to Bulgaria through privatization channel. The data is again 
presented in comparison with the peers of Bulgaria in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Table 7: Value of cross-border M&A, Sales, Millions of $ 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Bulgaria ... ... ... 20 90 32 71 497 61 1133 
Check 
republic 
... ... ... 226 408 2366 507 671 362 2402 
Croatia ... ... 43 23 45 94 48 61 16 1164 
Estonia ... ... ... ... ... 28 23 64 149 114 
Hungary 226 267 392 382 139 2106 1594 298 612 537 
Latvia ... ... ... ... 3 23 57 63 11 20 
Lithuania     9 ... ... 12 632 427 
Poland ... 74 1 396 197 357 983 993 808 1789 3707 
Romania ... ... ... ... 181 229 94 391 1 284 447 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 45 ... ... 
Slovakia ... ... ... 21 83 4 138 38 54 41 
Slovenia ... ... ... ... 41 18 30 133 … 14 
 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bulgaria 582 11 138 383 2685 2548 789 854 
Check 
republic 
1924 1968 5204 1756 558 6378 716 354 
Croatia 146 676 875 613 51 536 2535 672 
Estonia 131 88 15 14 18 82 4 13 
Hungary 1117 1370 1278 1109 453 2498 2524 721 
Latvia 342 39 4 12 ... 9 11 33 
Lithuania 173 193 225 135 102 61 88 35 
Poland 9316 3493 3131 802 1275 1598 974 1346 
Romania 536 66 124 493 2200 1851 5324 1784 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
... 2 268 ... 38 ... 112 274 
Slovakia 1849 1194 3350 160 432 120 1426 50 
Slovenia … 381 1502 1 168 160 15 52 
Source: Annex table B.7., UNCTAD (2003), Annex table B.4. UNCTAD (2005, 2008) 
It is visible from the data that each country with the exception of Serbia and Montenegro 
experienced one or several booms in the value of cross-border M&A which most likely 
occurred in a result of certain cases of acceleration in privatization in the respective countries. 
At least for Bulgaria this is the case – the peaks in the value of cross-border M&As are result 
of the second wave of privatization launched in 1999 (IMF, 1999) and conclusion of some 
major deals in 2004 including those for the telecommunication state company BTC and seven 
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big enterprises in the electricity sector where the state monopoly was dismantled8. However, 
in 2005 no privatization deals were finalized9, so a very probable conclusion is that M&As 
were conducted between large private companies. In 2005 the entire region of Central and 
Eastern Europe experienced a surge in the volume and value of M&As deals which was 
determined by the expected accession of some of the countries in the EU. The competition on 
the side of Western companies, searching to expand their activities and to increase efficiency, 
rose and many enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe combined their efforts to withstand 
the pressure. However some companies were acquired by foreign investors or risk capital 
funds10. Anyway, after the boom in 2004 and 2005 which affected the CEECs, the relative 
importance of M&As as a channel for FDI in the region decreased which can be seen from the 
percentage share of their value relative to the GDP of the countries in the region. 
Table 8: Cross-border M&A value as a percentage share of GDP 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bulgaria 0.16 1.18 0.14 2.46 1.16 0.02 0.24 0.62 3.99 3.57 0.99 0.99 
Check 
republic 
0.36 0.47 0.25 1.63 1.25 1.19 3.02 0.96 0.28 3.06 0.32 0.14 
Croatia 0.14 0.16 0.04 2.97 0.35 1.52 1.81 1.19 0.09 0.91 3.94 0.95 
Estonia 0.23 0.57 1.25 0.94 0.98 0.61 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.37 0.02 0.05 
Hungary 1.64 0.29 0.56 0.46 0.89 0.99 0.86 0.71 0.28 1.46 1.39 0.38 
Latvia 0.40 0.40 0.07 0.11 1.80 0.19 0.02 0.05 … 0.03 0.03 0.08 
Lithuania … 0.05 2.24 1.52 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.32 0.23 0.13 0.16 0.06 
Poland 0.32 0.24 0.49 0.97 2.31 0.83 0.71 0.18 0.26 0.30 0.17 0.22 
Romania 0.07 0.30 1.03 0.36 0.41 0.04 0.08 0.30 1.16 0.91 2.27 0.66 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
… … … … … 0.00 0.04 … 0.01 … 0.01 0.03 
Slovakia 0.28 0.07 0.10 0.07 3.12 1.84 4.80 0.22 0.55 0.14 1.47 0.05 
Slovenia 0.11 0.45 … 0.04 … 1.04 3.82 0.00 0.38 0.34 0.03 0.10 
Source: Annex table B.7., UNCTAD (2003), Annex table B.4. UNCTAD (2005, 2008); 
http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/Saveshow.asp for GDP in Millions of US $ at prices and PPPs of current 
year; author’s calculations 
Since 2005 FDI in Bulgaria grew more rapidly than the value of M&As deals. IMF (2006) 
points out that in this year the increase in FDI was driven by the greenfield investment 
projects. The number of greenfield projects in the leading countries excluding Hungary, 
which was outpaced by its peers (Check republic, Poland and Slovakia), and the one in 
Bulgaria and Romania, were constantly increasing during the last four years. This fact proves 
again the importance which greenfield investment has been gaining in the region as a channel 
of FDI. 
                                                 
8 http://priv.government.bg/apnew/Root/Files/stats/stats1406.htm 
9 http://priv.government.bg/apnew/Root/Files/stats/stats1406.htm 
10 http://www.econ.bg/news86022/article67974.html (available in Bulgarian only) 
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Table 9: Number of greenfield FDI projects by destination economy, 2003-2007 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bulgaria 77 98 109 142 298 151 
Check republic 94 145 148 152 181 149 
Croatia 33 44 40 46 39 32 
Estonia 32 30 43 65 60 32 
Hungary 210 218 224 212 256 219 
Latvia 38 44 30 87 121 33 
Lithuania 36 42 23 81 61 44 
Poland 91 154 240 275 350 333 
Romania 112 116 182 264 385 366 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
42 48 51 53 46 82 
Slovakia 44 66 89 119 118 100 
Slovenia 13 23 22 19 26 23 
Source: Annex table A.I.2., UNCTAD (2005), Annex table A.I.1., UNCTAD (2008) 
Regarding privatization as a factor determining FDI inflows to Bulgaria, it could be 
concluded that in the first couple of years of increasing growth of FDI, it actually led to the 
most of FDI in the country. But since 2005 other cross-border M&As between private 
companies and greenfield investment, especially after 2005, have gained more importance 
than the privatization.  
3.2. Prerequisites determining efficiency-seeking FDI 
In this part of analysis, I will concentrate jointly on two factors listed in the introduction – 
labour costs and pre-accession agreements with the EU. 
To start with, I would like to present and concentrate on the development of import and 
export of Bulgaria, which is presented in the following table. 
Table 10: FDI, exports and imports in millions of US$, at current exchange rates 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
FDI .. 103 94 108 427 536 813 1026 812 926 1421 2596 4319 7535 8910 
FDI % change from 
previous year 
.. .. -8.74 14.89 295.37 25.53 51.68 26.20 -20.86 14.04 53.46 82.69 66.37 74.46 18.25 
Exports: Goods 3728 3923 5336 4891 4854 4196 3977 4823 5135 5730 7548 9932 11765 15070 18494 
Exports % change from 
previous year 
.. 5.23 36.02 -8.34 -0.76 -13.56 -5.22 21.27 6.47 11.59 31.73 31.58 18.46 28.09 22.72 
Imports: Goods 4613 3959 5216 4703 4372 4565 5046 6005 6732 7330 10036 13603 17246 22049 28490 
Imports % change from 
previous year 
.. -14.18 31.75 -9.84 -7.04 4.41 10.54 19.01 12.11 8.88 36.92 35.54 26.78 27.85 29.21 
Source: http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/Saveshow.asp 
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From the table, it can be observed that after 2002, export and import of Bulgaria have been 
growing very rapidly. Import growth started outpacing the increase in export in 2003, which 
could be explained by the increase in domestic private consumption and investment goods 
(IMF, 2004). The following years domestic consumption surged driven by the expansion of 
household credits and increase in FDI (IMF, 2006). During the same period (2002-2006) the 
private consumption/GDP ratio was exhibiting a diminishing trend and consumer goods 
imports increased only moderately (IMF, 2007) which supports the assumption that the major 
part of the imported goods in this period entered the country as a stage of the process of 
efficiency-seeking FDI into the region. 
Evidence which back up this suggestion include data for the level of labour costs in Bulgaria 
and Romania which entered the EU in 2007 but were well integrated into its structures several 
years before that. 
Table 11: Earnings in industry and services in EUR (average gross annual earnings of 
full time employees in enterprises with 10 or more employees) 
 
Source: European commission (2008) 
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Table 12: Labour costs in EUR (average hourly labour costs in industry and services of 
full-time employees in enterprises with 10 or more employees) 
 
Source: European commission (2008) 
* Break in series: the Netherlands, 1997; Lithuania, 2000; Spain, 2001; Malta, 2003 
It can be observed from the tables that labour costs in Bulgaria and Romania are substantially 
lower than those in the rest of the EU countries. Wages in Bulgaria and Romania are 2-3 
times lower even compared with the countries which joint the EU in 2004. In addition, the 
education level and the quality of labour force in the two countries are competitive relative to 
rest of the EU countries which can be seen from the next table.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
50 
Table 13: Pupils and students (excluding pre-primary education) 
 
Source: European commission (2008) 
In addition, throughout the transition process, including present years, the level of 
unemployment in both countries remained high compared to the countries in Central Europe, 
not to mention western European economies. This fact shows that labour was relatively 
abundant in these two countries. 
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Table 14: Unemployment rate in the EU in % 
 
Source: European commission (2008) 
Despite all the facts presented above, a necessary prerequisite for efficiency-seeking 
investment to take place is that trade costs are sufficiently low in order not to offset low 
labour costs.  
With regard to Bulgaria, integration of the country into the single European market started as 
early as 1993, when the Europe agreement came into force (European commission, 2005). 
With this agreement, a gradual decrease and eventual abolishment of all tariff and non-tariff 
trade restrictions on industrial goods was specified to be achieved over a period of maximum 
ten years11. As of 2003 traditional goods subject to the trade between Bulgaria and EU were 
free of any trade restrictions and last discussions were taking place in order to further prepare 
Bulgaria for its EU membership by immediate or gradual abolishment of import duties and 
export refunds on processed agricultural goods (Commission of the European communities, 
                                                 
11 http://europe.bg/en/htmls/page.php?id=533&category=10&page=4 
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2004). Meanwhile, while removing tariff rates on industrial products, many agricultural goods 
also became free of tariff rates or quotas (Commission of European communities, 2002, 2003, 
2004).  
In parallel with negotiations with the EU, Bulgaria became a member of the Central European 
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in 1999. In the same year, a free-trade agreement with 
Turkey came into force. Before that, in 1997 a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between 
Bulgaria and the European Free Trade Association12 (EFTA) was implemented (European 
commission, 1999).  
In addition, Romania followed the same timeline of negotiations and agreements with the EU 
as Bulgaria, since the two countries candidacies had been evaluated and decided on 
interdependently.    
Moreover, the bulk of the FDI flows to Bulgaria and Romania come from a broadly similar 
list of countries among which one for each country is situated outside the EU. As of the end 
of 2007 the top ten FDI source countries for Bulgaria are Austria, the Netherlands, Greece, 
UK, Germany, Cyprus, USA, Ireland, Hungary and Spain in this order, and for Romania – 
Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Switzerland, Cyprus, Turkey and 
Hungary in this order with USA being out of top 10 direct investors only in 2007. Regarding 
the direct investment source countries which are not members of the EU – USA is an 
important strategic investor for the union and Turkey is the largest economy on the Balkan 
Peninsula, so their presence among the biggest investors in the region is not surprising.  
In addition, the value if investment coming from the countries listed above surged during the 
past four to five years. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Members of EFTA are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland 
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Table 15: FDI stock in Bulgaria – top ten biggest investors as of the end of 2007 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Total 2173.8 2905.6 3342.1 3926.6 5044.6 7420.7 11756.5 17704.3 26874.0 
Austria 122.2 204.1 298.2 580.1 673.0 1505.6 3479.4 4613.5 5341.5 
Netherlands 79.9 201.8 310.6 167.7 472.9 632.2 940.7 1882.1 4695.8 
Greece 95.7 233.3 273.1 472.4 541.4 637.2 1029.3 1689.8 2406.9 
United 
Kingdom 239.2 220.3 239.7 227.3 300.7 343.7 648.7 1435.2 2105.5 
Germany 419.4 353.9 327.0 439.9 439.7 680.7 776.8 1076.1 1509.6 
Cyprus 209.1 293.0 292.2 360.1 447.9 470.1 643.0 851.5 1452.6 
USA 260.0 281.5 322.1 335.3 374.6 451.3 614.0 825.5 952.1 
Ireland 4.9 11.9 3.7 1.1 2.5 19.7 108.2 526.4 858.8 
Hungary 8.2 6.4 8.9 18.5 177.8 224.4 311.2 487.9 728.6 
Spain 57.2 2.0 7.0 6.8 10.8 18.2 58.7 220.2 724.1 
*Preliminary data 
Source: Bulgarian National Bank website. Available at 
http://www.bnb.bg/bnb/home.nsf/fsWebIndex?OpenFrameset 
Table 17: FDI stock in Romania – top ten biggest investors as of the end of 2007 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Total 2173.8 2905.6 3342.1 3926.6 5044.6 7420.7 11756.5 17704.3 26874.0 
Austria 122.2 204.1 298.2 580.1 673.0 1505.6 3479.4 4613.5 5341.5 
Netherlands 79.9 201.8 310.6 167.7 472.9 632.2 940.7 1882.1 4695.8 
Greece 95.7 233.3 273.1 472.4 541.4 637.2 1029.3 1689.8 2406.9 
United 
Kingdom 239.2 220.3 239.7 227.3 300.7 343.7 648.7 1435.2 2105.5 
Germany 419.4 353.9 327.0 439.9 439.7 680.7 776.8 1076.1 1509.6 
Cyprus 209.1 293.0 292.2 360.1 447.9 470.1 643.0 851.5 1452.6 
USA 260.0 281.5 322.1 335.3 374.6 451.3 614.0 825.5 952.1 
Ireland 4.9 11.9 3.7 1.1 2.5 19.7 108.2 526.4 858.8 
Hungary 8.2 6.4 8.9 18.5 177.8 224.4 311.2 487.9 728.6 
Spain 57.2 2.0 7.0 6.8 10.8 18.2 58.7 220.2 724.1 
Source: The National Bank of Romania. Available at http://www.bnro.ro/Foreign-direct-investment-3213.aspx 
All the information presented in the current subsection backs up the conclusion that Bulgaria 
and Romania are turning into an attractive cluster for investors who are seeking to minimize 
their production costs by undertaking efficiency-seeking FDI. 
3.3.Reforms related to the EU accession and reforms aiming at creating favourable 
investment climate 
In its 2002 regular report on the progress of Bulgaria towards EU membership issued in 
October 2002, the European commission concluded that Bulgaria is a functioning market 
economy (European commission, 2002). According to the definition, used by EU institutions 
this means the following:   
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“The existence of a functioning market economy requires that prices, as well as trade, are 
liberalised and that an enforceable legal system, including property rights, is in place. The 
performance of a market economy is enhanced by macroeconomic stability and consensus 
about economic policy. A well-developed financial sector and the absence of any significant 
barriers to market entry and exit improve the efficiency of the economy.” (European 
commission, 1998, p. 16) 
The statement is quite convincing regarding the investment climate in Bulgaria. However, 
despite of the great deal of reforms which were undertaken and finished, the European 
commission conclusions include further recommendations for improvement. 
The main problems, hampering business and creating prerequisites for existence of poor 
business environment at the opening of the millennium according to the commission of 
European communities (2000) were corruption, inefficient and slow state administration and 
judiciary system, barriers to market entry and exit, poor protection of property rights and 
enforcement of contracts, low level of financial intermediation on the part of banking sector 
and bad quality of infrastructure. Next, I will deal with reforms in each of these areas of 
impediments and what was left to be done after the accession of Bulgaria into the EU. 
3.3.1. State administration 
In 2000 the legal framework for changing Bulgarian state administration and turning it into a 
modern and efficient one, was enhanced by adopting the most necessary at that moment 
secondary legislation13. In addition in December 2000 the Prime Minister approved a Code of 
Ethics for Civil Servants which provided guidance about proper personal conduct on duty and 
in private and public life (European commission, 2001).  
In June 2002 a strategy for Modernisation of State Administration was adopted. The strategy 
was based on the following principles: accountability of the administration, effectiveness of 
the state policies, coherence of activities, openness to citizens and participation of all groups 
in society in framing the policy. Particular measures were listed in order to improve civil 
service through upgrading of working methods and combating corruption and to strengthen 
the capacity to administer European funds. The Civil Service Law and the Law of State 
Administration framed the main values followed by the state clerks like loyalty, 
responsibility, legality, stability, hierarchical subordination and political neutrality. Further 
                                                 
13 Unlike laws which are adopted by Bulgarian Parliament, Ministries are in charge of preparing secondary 
legislation for implementing approved laws and setting the structure of Ministries and other administrative 
bodies (European Commission, 2000, 2001) 
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steps were taken in making public information more easily accessible by the citizens 
(Commission of the European communities, 2002). 
In order to precede with the reform of the state administration a programme and an action 
plan for the implementation of the Strategy for Modernization of State Administration were 
adopted by the government in January 2003. Following the statements in the program, a 
Council for the Modernisation of the State Administration was created in March. The Council 
was set to be responsible for the implementation of the action plan and it reported directly to 
the Council of Ministers. In the action plan, amendments to the laws of Civil Service and on 
Administration as well as in the the new law on limiting the Administrative Regulation and 
Administrative Control of Economic Activity were planed to be adopted (Commission of the 
European communities, 2003). The Law on Reduction of Administrative Regulation and 
Administrative Control, which entered into force in December 2003 (Commission of the 
European communities, 2004), aimed at regulating regimes for obtaining different licences 
and permits and improving transparency of the process of decision-making on behalf of the 
state administration (Commission of the European communities, 2003). In addition, in order 
access to public information to be further improved, amendments to the Law of on Access to 
Public Information were adopted in May 2003 with which the number of institutions 
responsible for providing citizens with public information was increased and the definition of 
the term “public information” was changed in order discretion in judgements of persons 
responsible for providing of the information to be reduced (Commission of the European 
communities, 2003). 
The proposed amendments to the Law of Civil Service were approved by the parliament in 
October 2003 and entered into force in January 2004. They concerned the definition of the 
term “civil servant” which was made more precise and procedures of recruitment, training and 
subsequent work evaluation. All changes aimed at providing for an independent, efficient and 
accountable state administration (Commission of the European communities, 2004).  
In April 2005, the Council for the Modernization of Public Administration approved a White 
Paper on the Modernization of the Administration. In the Paper further actions aiming at 
improving of service delivery, accountability and budgetary control were outlined (European 
commission, 2005). 
In March 2006, the proposed amendments to the Law on Administration and further 
amendments to the Civil Servant Act were approved. With the Law on Administration a clear 
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distinction between administrative and political levels of the state administration was 
outlined; roles and responsibilities were clarified and the involvement of public officials in 
the management of private companies was regulated. Regarding the Civil Service Act further 
progress was made concerning recruitment, training and mobility of civil servants. Also in 
March 2006 the Code of Administrative Procedure was adopted (Commission of the 
European communities, 2006). 
As of May 2006, the Commission of the European communities concluded that “overall, 
Bulgaria has made good progress in the field of public administration and is on the way to 
have an efficient state administration provided that the current path of reform is maintained.” 
(Commission of the European communities, 2006, p. 5). 
3.3.2. Judicial system 
As of 2000 Bulgarian judicial system had suffered many deficiencies. Among the most 
important had been delays in the administrative processing of cases resulting in a long length 
of judicial proceedings, large number of cases returned by courts to the public prosecutors 
because of incomplete investigation, non-equal presentation in cases of seeking justice and 
poor execution of judgements. A big step towards improving the system was the adoption of a 
Strategy for Reform of the Judicial System in Bulgaria in October 2001 (European 
commission, 2001). Accordingly, in March 2002 an action plan for implementation of the 
strategy was approved and the respective amendments in the Law on the Judicial System, 
necessary for the implementation of the Strategy were adopted in July 2002. The actions 
outlined in the Strategy were aimed at improving management, administration and human 
resource potential of Bulgarian judicial system (Commission of the European communities, 
2002).  
However, advancement of the reforms was stopped by the declaration of the Constitutional 
Court stating that certain provisions of the revised Law on the Judiciary were unconstitutional 
and their followed annulment in December 2002. As a result, a parliamentary commission 
was established with the purpose to deal with the necessary amendments to the constitution. 
In parallel, the strategy and the action plan were updated and their scope was expanded to 
cover constitutional changes, procedural legislation and administrative justice. In order for the 
court proceedings to be made more efficient amendments to the Civil Procedural Code and 
the Penal Procedural Code were approved in October 2002 and May 2003 respectively. The 
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amendments concerned mechanisms for enforcement of judgements and reducing the duration 
of procedures. In addition, in September 2003 amendments to the constitution regarding the 
immunity of magistrates and especially abolishment of the absolute immunity were adopted 
by the parliament which represented a very serious step forward (Commission of the 
European communities, 2003). 
In 2004 some legislative progress was made regarding the pre-trial phase. In addition, rules 
for appraisal of the work performance concerning activities and workload of judges, 
prosecutors and investigators were put in place aiming at improvement in managing the 
workload and subsequent reduction of delay in deciding cases (European commission, 2005). 
 In December 2005 the Minister of Justice developed and announced an action plan for 
reforms in the period 2006-2007. Regarding the pre-trial phase, in April 2006 a new Penal 
Procedure Code entered into force and a mechanism for monitoring its adequacy was 
established in January in the same year. Amendments to the Law on judiciary concerning 
random allocation of cases in courts, investigation services and prosecution offices were 
adopted. In March 2006 both amendments to the constitution establishing the Prosecution 
Service to be responsible for investigations and new Administrative Procedural Code were 
adopted (Commission of the European communities, 2006). 
Despite of the many reformed and implemented pieces of legislation, the Commission of the 
European communities concluded as of 2006 that “overall, limited progress has been made 
both in terms of quality and accountability of justice as well as regarding the institutional 
relations between the executive and the justice system. Bulgaria needs to complete the reform 
of the judiciary, ensure tangible results, and take the additional steps to guarantee its 
independence.” (Commission of the European communities, 2006, p. 7). 
3.3.3. Corruption 
In the year 2000, corruption was one of the main obstacles in front of improvement of the 
business climate in Bulgaria. As reasons for this were perceived low salaries, imperfect 
legislation, unreliable judicial system and the lack of administrative control (Commission of 
the European communities, 2002). Accordingly, in October 2001 a National Strategy for 
Combating Corruption was adopted by the Council of Ministers. The strategy consisted of 
four main parts concerning creation of legal and institutional environment which would not 
favour corrupt activities, fighting corruption in the economy, anti-corruption reform in the 
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judicial system and anti-corruption cooperation between government, non-governmental 
institutions and media. It aimed at achieving transparency, clarity and accountability between 
institutions and citizens. Another step in combating corruption was the enforcement of the 
new Political Parties Act which contained clear rules regarding financing political parties. In 
2001, the government also submitted amendments to twenty-one laws with the many 
registration and licensing regimes to be either facilitated or eliminated – a step as much 
pointed to reducing market entry barriers as to fighting corruption. However, much was left to 
be done with regard to enforcement of provisions in various pieces of legislation aiming at 
curbing corruption (European commission, 2001). 
In February 2001, an Action Plan for Implementation of the Strategy for Combating 
Corruption for the years 2001-2002 where particular measures, responsible persons and 
deadlines were outlined, was approved by the Council of Ministers. In addition, a committee 
was created in order to coordinate activities in the fight against corruption. In 2001, the 
country’s ranking of indices of perceived corruption improved.  
Amendments to a number of laws were adopted in 2002. Among them was the Penal Code 
which introduced more precise provisions on corruption and organised crime.  
On the international side, Bulgaria ratified the Criminal law Convention on Corruption and 
the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime in November 2001. The country is also a party to the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions and is a member of the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption 
(GRECO). According to the report of GRECO which was adopted in May 2002, more had 
been done in improving the legal framework for combating corruption than in its actual 
implementation and enforcement. The major critics concerned the slowness of the criminal 
procedure and the lack of many actual sanctions (Commission of the European communities, 
2002). 
In October 2002, a parliament commission for fight against corruption was created. In 2003 
income and property declarations became compulsory for magistrates and their spouses and 
children and for customs officials. In the same year, the National Association of Court 
Officials adopted a code of ethics which specified the actions court clerks should undertake in 
case of being offered a bribe (Commission of the European communities, 2003). 
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In December 2003, the government adopted updated Action Plan for Implementation of the 
Strategy for Combating Corruption which covered the period 2003-2005. An inter-ministerial 
committee responsible for implementation of the strategy and the action plan was set in 
February 2003. The emphasis was put on preventing corruption and development of control. 
In February 2004, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted a strategy for the fight against 
corruption in the judicial system In addition, in March a professional code of ethics for judges 
was approved.  
Special investigation departments were set up by the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office. 
In addition, in November 2003 a Commission for Prevention and Counteracting Corruption 
was established under the authority of the Supreme Judicial Council with the purpose to 
outline the policy for the fight against corruption in the judicial system. Special units in many 
institutions including police and border guards were created in order to combat corruption. As 
a result of all undertaken reforms and measures, the number of pre-trial proceedings on 
corruption charges increased in 2003 (Commission of the European communities, 2004). 
In February 2005 the Strategy for Combating Corruption was updated in order high-level 
corruption, including corruption in the administration of executive power and public 
procurement, to be addressed. In the same year a new Law on Political Parties was adopted 
aiming at a further increase in transparency and accountability of funding and thus 
eliminating corruption practices in this field. In addition, in September 2005 amendments to 
the Law on Administrative Violations and Sanctions were adopted in order to set the liability 
of legal persons.  The necessary structures to fight with the corruption within judicial system, 
enforcement agencies and the Ministry of Interior were functioning though with varying 
effectiveness (European commission, 2005). 
Eventually, in December 2005, a Code of ethics regulating the work of government members 
and politically appointed officials was adopted by the Council of Ministers. According to the 
code, the persons referred to could not be partners in private entities, were set to be 
responsible for managing the resources appointed to them and had to take measures to prevent 
corruption. In January 2006, after consultations with non-governmental organizations, the 
new Anti-Corruption Strategy for the period 2006-2008 and the Action Plan for its 
implementation were adopted, both of them aiming at fighting the high-level corruption.   
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Also in the beginning of 2006, an Ethics committee was established in the parliament. In 
March, constitutional amendments allowing for lifting the immunity provided that a member 
of the Parliament had given his written consent for opening of court case were passed. At the 
same time, a specialised department designed to supervise the pre-trial procedure in cases 
concerning high-level corruption or organized crime was created at the General Prosecutor’s 
Office (Commission of the European communities, 2006). 
As of May 2006, the Commission of the European communities concluded that “overall, 
certain progress has been made in fighting corruption. Bulgaria needs to present clear 
evidence of results in its fight against corruption, in particular high-level  
corruption.”(2006, p. 8). 
3.3.4. Market entry and exit, protection of property rights and enforcement of 
contracts, financial intermediation and infrastructure 
According to the Commission of the European communities annual progress reports for the 
period 2001-2006, the progress in these areas was as follows. 
Market entry and exit 
In 2000, entry and exit of the market place were not working properly. At this time there were 
more than five hundred licensing regimes, which imposed additional time and money burden 
on enterprises and created preconditions for corruption due to the lack of transparency in 
procedures. Regarding market exit, the insolvency procedure was very slow due to the lacking 
legislative provisions regarding deadlines for debtors to pay their dues to creditors.  
Accordingly, during the entire period licensing regimes had been being eliminated or 
simplified. In parallel, in 2002 a new bank bankruptcy law was adopted whose provisions 
aimed at speeding up the procedure. In June 2003, in the adopted amendments of the 
Commercial Code, it was stated that a company which failed to make an outstanding payment 
in sixty days after it was due should be considered insolvent.  
A new Law on Investment Promotion set shortened deadlines for authorization of major 
investment projects. Also, the long waited Law on Bulstat registry was passed in April 2005 
which was to serve as a base for establishment of a central register of legal entities. Following 
this, in March 2006 a new Commercial Register Law aiming at turning a business registration 
into a pure administrative procedure and taking it out of courts competencies was adopted. 
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Amendments to the insolvency legislation were submitted to the Parliament in November 
2005 aiming at increasing efficiency and the speed of insolvency procedures.  
Protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts 
In 2000, contract enforcement had been suffering from the slow and inefficient judiciary 
system because of which in most cases parties did not file cases in courts when contracts had 
not been respected. Accordingly, the extent to which contracts were respected was low due to 
the lack of reliable enforcement. Likewise, the enforcement of property rights was hampered 
by the insufficient legislative framework. However, large foreign companies were sometimes 
able to overcome these obstacles by turning directly to political decision-maker but this 
option was rarely available for smaller or domestic companies.  
Unfortunately, as of May 2006 not much had been done with respect to improving property 
rights and contract enforcement. This was due mainly to the dependence of their effectiveness 
on the effectiveness of judicial system and to a lesser extent on the effectiveness of the state 
administration. 
Financial intermediation 
In 2000, financial intermediation on behalf of banking system was very limited and low. The 
total amount of credits to the private sector amounted to 14.7 % of GDP. Gradually, the level 
of financial intermediation improved. At the end of 2001, credit to the private sector increased 
to 15 % and further to 19 % at the end of 2002 and continued to increase with 50 % pace 
annually.  
 Infrastructure 
In 2000, many investors stated the low quality of road, railway and port infrastructure as a 
major obstacle in front of their business. In general, during the entire period the quality of 
infrastructure remained low and slowly improving. The transport infrastructure had been 
being upgraded through the joint efforts of Bulgarian government and international 
organizations, mainly funded wit money from the pre-accession EU funds. The information 
and telecommunication infrastructures were steadily improving though at a different pace 
within different areas. The fixed telephone network was making a slow progress, while 
mobile telephone and internet networks were rapidly improving. Energy infrastructure 
investment was oriented towards the physical unbundling of the sector, improving the quality 
for the final consumers and connecting networks with the neighbouring countries. 
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While it is true that most of the reforms in the present section were undertaken in order 
Bulgaria to fulfil the criteria for full membership in the EU, it is out of question that they also 
helped improving business environment in the country immensely. For example, the number 
of procedures necessary to go through in order to start a business in 2004 had been ten, the 
entire procedure duration had been thirty days, the costs had amounted to 8.3 % of income per 
capita and the required minimum capital had amounted to 134.4 % of income per capita 
(World bank, 2004). To make a comparison, in 2007 the number of procedures was nine and 
it took thirty-two days and 7.9 % of income per capita to start a new business; the required 
minimum capital was in the range of 91 % of income per capita (World bank, 2007). These 
numbers show some progress but as the European commission pointed at the edge of the 
accession of Bulgaria into the EU, mush had left to be done. However, the advancement in 
improving business environment and encouraging FDI was visible. Moreover, the efforts and 
determination of the government and all other institutions which are engaged in the process of 
reformation influence positively investors’ perception about options of undertaking business 
in Bulgaria.  
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V. LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
Many factors could be outlined as determinants of FDI in general and in transition economies 
in particular. I am not aware of any other research which covers thoroughly FDI determinants 
in Bulgaria. However, when taking into account the qualitative and descriptive nature of the 
current thesis, one direction for further research could be the quantitative examination of the 
impact of the factors referred to in the thesis. While it is true that the factors interact with each 
other, it would be instructive to examine the influence of which one is the strongest. 
In addition, it would be interesting to observe how the investment climate in the country will 
change in the future, including because of the reforms recommended by the EU at the edge of 
the accession of Bulgaria. It is unquestionable that resources from the EU funds could assist 
further development of the country especially with respect to development of infrastructure. It 
would be worth examining how Bulgaria will manage these resources in order to further 
improve the investment climate in the country and attract larger amount of FDI flows. 
Finally, another direction for further research work is to analyse the process of real income 
convergence of Bulgaria with the EU countries. It has been shown that wages in Bulgaria are 
the lowest in the EU. Since FDI is among the major vehicles of economic development and 
income convergence it is worth investigating the convergence process. More concrete 
research questions could be approximately when this convergence will take place and what its 
impact on FDI flows in general and on the efficiency-seeking one in particular will be.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In the light of FDI boom at the end of twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
determinants and effects of FDI have been gaining attention and the amount of research work 
dedicated to them has been rising. Among the most interesting research questions is the one 
about factors determining FDI flows into transition economies and especially those in the 
Central and Eastern Europe. Among transition economies in this region, Bulgaria stands out 
as the one with the fastest growing FDI inflows during the period 2003-2007. 
In the current master thesis, considerable attention is paid to several factors determining FDI 
inflows. Firstly, privatization process is examined. After investigating various aspects of 
privatization, this paper concludes that while it played a substantial role in attracting FDI in 
the beginning of the period, when approaching its end, M&A between private companies and 
especially greenfield investment are gaining larger importance as channels of inward FDI. 
Secondly, when compared with Western and even Central European countries regarding 
factors determining efficiency-seeking FDI, Bulgaria and Romania turn out to have advantage 
with respect to quality and abundance of labour and labour costs. When combined with 
removed trade barriers like tariffs and quotas which reduced the overall level of trade cost and 
more or less equalized it with the one of Western and Central European countries, Bulgaria 
and Romania clearly have the potential of becoming an attractive geographic cluster for 
efficiency-seeking FDI and there is no reason to reject this assumption as a factor determining 
the significant increase of FDI flows to Bulgaria. 
Finally, I find out that many of the reforms undertaken by Bulgarian institutions with respect 
to the upcoming EU accession have had a positive impact on the investment climate in the 
country. Actually, the conditions for doing business in Bulgaria have improved during the 
investigating period. Nevertheless there is still much work to be accomplished, the 
determination of the government increased the credit rating of the country which is proved to 
influence investors’ decision when choosing location for undertaking FDI. Thus reforms 
launched in Bulgaria during the period 2002-2007 have influenced positively FDI inflows to 
the country. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: FDI inflows, Millions of US $ 
Country 
1990- 
1995 
(annual 
average) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bulgaria 57 109 505 537 819 1002 689 905 2097 2488 3923 7507 8429 
Check 
republic 
120a 516 551 1014 1635 1127 1442 8483 2101 4463 11658 6013 9123 
Croatia 947  1428 1300 3718 6324 4986 4916 1126 2042 1076 1788 3423 4925 
Estonia 165  150 267 581 305 387 538 284 891 926 2879 1674 2482 
Hungary 1 863  2275 2173 2036 1944 1643 2414 2994 2162 4167 7709 6790 5571 
Latvia 116b 382 521 357 348 408 201 254 300 647 713 1664 2173 
Lithuania 36b 152 355 926 486 379 446 732 179 773 1032 1840 1934 
Poland 1396 4498 4908 6365 7270 9342 8830 4131 4123 6159 10363 19198 17580 
Romania 162 263 1215 2031 1041 1025 1137 1144 2213 5174 6483 11366 9774 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
... ... 178
c  113 112 25 165 137 1360 966 2087 5118 3985 
Slovakia 147 251 220 684 390 2075 1475 4094 669 1122 2107 4165 3265 
Slovenia 100 194 375 248 181 176 442 1686 337 516 577 645 1426 
Source: Annex table B.1., UNCTAD (2002, 2004, 2005, 2008) 
a Annual average from 1993 to 1995 
b Annual average from 1992 to 1995 
c Annual average from 1992 to 1997 
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Appendix 2: FDI inflows as a percentage share of GDP 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bulgaria 0.25 1.20 1.21 1.78 2.00 1.28 1.55 3.38 3.70 5.49 9.41 9.81 
Check 
republic 
0.37 0.39 0.71 1.11 0.73 0.87 4.93 1.14 2.26 5.59 2.67 3.68 
Croatia 4.14 3.46 9.50 16.15 12.06 11.02 2.32 3.95 1.93 3.03 5.32 6.93 
Estonia 1.51 2.37 4.86 2.52 2.89 3.71 1.75 4.93 4.66 13.03 6.72 9.09 
Hungary 2.35 2.10 1.85 1.68 1.31 1.75 2.01 1.38 2.54 4.51 3.74 2.95 
Latvia 2.69 3.33 2.14 1.98 2.14 0.96 1.10 1.21 2.38 2.38 4.88 5.51 
Lithuania 0.65 1.37 3.28 1.73 1.26 1.34 2.00 0.43 1.73 2.13 3.44 3.21 
Poland 1.44 1.44 1.76 1.90 2.31 2.11 0.93 0.90 1.24 1.97 3.39 2.87 
Romania 0.19 0.94 1.63 0.84 0.78 0.77 0.72 1.33 2.72 3.19 4.84 3.60 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
… … … … … 0.03 0.02 0.22 0.14 0.29 0.64 0.45 
Slovakia 0.51 0.42 1.23 0.69 3.51 2.27 5.87 0.91 1.42 2.42 4.29 3.01 
Slovenia 0.71 1.28 0.80 0.55 0.51 1.21 4.29 0.83 1.16 1.23 1.29 2.64 
Source: Annex table B.1., UNCTAD (2002, 2004, 2005, 2008); http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/Saveshow.asp 
for GDP in Millions of US $ at prices and purchasing power parities (PPPs) of current year; author’s calculations 
 
